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Abstract
This thesis presents a theoretical study of the impact of non-compliance 
and market power in a fishery regulated using individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs). The study analyses individual firm quota demands in 
the presence of non-compliance and/or market power and the resultant 
properties of the ITQ market. The analysis is static and set in a single­
species fishery.
The implications of non-compliance for a fishery composed entirely 
of competitive firms are examined first. Here the analysis departs from 
the convention in the literature on analogous pollution permit markets in 
that firms’ expected penalties are modelled as a function of their relative 
violations of quotas. This has a significant effect upon the results, includ­
ing the possibility of quota prices which are higher with non-compliance.
The research then focuses on market power in the setting of a single 
dominant firm faced by a fringe of competitive firms. The dominant firm 
is allowed market power in the quota market alone and then in both quota 
and output markets simultaneously. In the latter case the results differ 
from those previously reported in the literature, including the possibility 
that the firm may be freely compliant, or if cheating, may have a positive 
quota demand even with a zero initial quota allocation. Finally, the 
effects of non-compliance by the dominant firm and the competitive fringe 
are explored.
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1. Introduction and literature review
1.1 Introduction
This thesis examines the profit maximising behaviour of fishing firms under reg­
ulation using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) when firms are non-compliant 
and/or have market power in the quota market or in both quota and output mar­
kets. The implications for the (static) properties of quota markets and hence the 
efficiency of ITQ regulation are considered. As we will see below, the implications 
of these market imperfections for ITQ systems have received very little attention, 
in contrast to the situation for pollution permit markets where a significant body of 
literature now exists.
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on ITQs and on pollution permits before 
setting out the motivation for the specific research described in the thesis. The 
contents of the subsequent chapters are then briefly presented.
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1.2 Literature review
1 .2 .1  Individual transferable quotas in fisheries
ITQs represent tradeable rights to produce output in a commercial fishery (Moloney 
and Pearse, 1979, Pearse, 1980). Increasingly widely employed in fisheries manage­
ment, in practice ITQs are usually defined as percentages of an annual total allowable 
catch (TAC) for a fishery, but within-year are then tradeable between firms in nomi­
nal (tonnage) terms (see, for example, Anderson, 1995, Squires, Kirkley and Tisdell, 
1995, Grafton, 1996).1 Thus, ITQ markets are generally characterised by both lease 
and asset markets, with prices determined according to expected profits in the usual 
maimer (e.g., Batstone and Sharp, 2003, Newell, Sanchirico and Kerr, 2005, Newell, 
Papps and Sanchirico, 2007).2
1 ITQ fisheries management systems are used in A ustralia, New Zealand, Canada, Iceland, Chile and the 
Netherlands. In other countries, such as the UK and Denmark, quota trading is an increasingly im portant 
feature of the quota management system.
2 In addition, Bergland and Pedersen (2006) study the im pact of uncertainty and risk aversion upon ITQ 
prices.
2
Given certain assumptions (e.g., Boyce, 1992), the theoretical potential for ITQs to 
achieve an efficient solution to the problem of regulating the overall level of harvest 
in a fishery is well-established (Arnason, 1990, Clark, 1990). Despite concerns about 
non-compliance with individual quotas (e.g., Copes, 1986),3 as well as the possibility 
of firms acquiring market power in the quota market (see, for example, Armstrong 
and Sumaila, 2001),4 however, remarkably little attention has been paid to these 
aspects of quota markets and the implications for economic outcomes, in particular 
the prices at which quota is traded. This is somewhat surprising, since quota prices 
can send strong signals to managers about the level of profitability in the fishery 
(Arnason, 1990, Batstone and Sharp, 2003), Indeed, for this reason, Arnason (1990) 
suggested that key fishery management decisions could be based upon observed 
quota prices.
The mainstream theoretical literature on fisheries enforcement, which includes Su-
3 Non-compliance in general is an endemic problem in fisheries regulation. O utput controls, such as quotas, 
are particularly difficult to enforce (see, for example, H atcher and Gordon, 2005).
4 Many “industrialised” fisheries are characterised by a relatively small number of firms, raising the pos­
sibility of the acquisition of market power in ou tpu t and /o r quota markets.
3
tinen and Andersen (1985), Anderson and Lee (1986), Milliman (1986), Anderson 
(1989), Furlong (1991), Charles (1993), Charles, Mazany and Cross (1999) and 
Jensen and Vestergaard (2002), has focused principally on incentives for compliance 
and the optimal enforcement of regulations. There are only two published studies 
which analyse the specific impacts of non-compliance upon ITQ markets. Chavez 
and Salgado (2005) examine the properties of an ITQ market when firms cheat, 
although their analysis follows closely that of the pollution permit literature (see 
below) in assuming that firms’ expected penalties for non-compliance depend upon 
level violations of quota demands (e.g., Malik 1990, 2002), so that they derive very 
similar results. Hatcher (2005) also examines the effect of non-compliance on a quota 
market, but with a more general specification of the violation argument in the firm’s 
expected penalty function. Here, as we will see, the impact of non-compliance is 
found to be less straightforward.0
There are similarly few analytical studies which address market power in ITQ mar­
5 Hatcher (2005) reports preliminary results from C hapter 3 of this thesis.
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kets. Anderson (1991) examines the profit-maximising behaviour of a (compliant) 
dominant fishing firm which has market power in both the quota market and the cor­
responding output market. He finds that if the dominant firm is initially allocated 
all the quota, in exercising monopoly power it will find it profitable to hold quota 
in excess of its level of production, so increasing the output price. In the case where 
the dominant firm initially owns no quota, however, there is no incentive for the 
firm to hold excess quota, a result which Anderson generalises to any dominant firm 
with monopsony power in the quota market. Adelaja, Menzo and McCay (1998) 
employ a Bertrand pricing model to test empirically for output market power in a 
shellfish fishery under ITQ management, but find no evidence that quota trading has 
resulted in industrial concentration sufficient for the emergence of monopoly power. 
Armstrong (2008) analyses a dynamic quota allocation model, along the lines of the 
dynamic pollution permit model analysed by Hagem and Westskog (1998) (see be­
low). She finds that a history-dependent quota allocation, whereby per period quota 
endowments are adjusted according to actual quota usage in the previous period, 
can be superior to either “durable quotas” (see Hagem and Westskog, 1998) or short
5
term (lease-only) allocations in terms of time efficiency as well as static efficiency in 
the face of market power.
There also appears to be very little analysis of non-compliance or market power 
in the context of output quotas in agriculture or forestry. Giannakas and Fulton 
(2000) analyse the impact of non-compliance with agricultural output quota and 
subsidy programmes upon the distribution of surplus between producers and con­
sumers, while Giannakas and Fulton (2003) consider the corresponding implications 
for enforcement policy. Amacher, Kosltela and Ollikainen (2007) study the effects 
of illegal logging in the form of underreporting of timber harvest volumes and the 
implications for the design of royalty schemes.
Given the limited literature on non-compliance and market power in ITQ markets, 
we turn to the more much more extensive literature concerning markets for pollution 
permits. Theoretical models of pollution permit markets are closely analogous to 
ITQ markets in that, in each case, firm profits can appropriately be modelled as a
6
concave function of pollutant emissions (catch), so that the demand curve for permits 
(quota) is downward sloping. The major difference between pollution permits and 
ITQs is that the latter define rights directly over the production of marketable 
output, whereas in the case of the former there is only an indirect relationship 
between permits and output (see below).
1 .2 .2  Pollution permits
We focus here on the impact of non-compliance and market power on the (static) 
properties of markets for tradeable pollution permits (emissions permits, or dis­
charge permits; see Tietenberg, 1980, 1985). Montgomery (1972) is generally cited 
as the founding economic analysis of tradeable pollution permits. Montgomery es­
tablishes the efficiency property of tradeable permits in a perfectly competitive mar­
ket, whereby aggregate abatement costs are minimised as each firm sets its marginal 
cost of abatement equal to the permit price at market equilibrium. The efficient 
outcome is, moreover, independent of the initial distribution of permits and permit
7
allocation is then purely an equity issue.6
Hahn (1984) examines the impact of market power on efficiency in transferable 
property rights (here pollution permit) markets. In particular, he looks at how 
the behaviour of a firm with market power in a permit market varies with changes 
in the initial distribution of permits. Assuming that all trades take place at a 
single equilibrium price, Hahn finds that the degree of inefficiency in the market is 
systematically related to the initial permit distribution. In general, the behaviour of 
a firm with market power resembles that of a monopsonist or monopolist, depending 
upon whether the firm is a net purchaser or a net seller of permits.
In Hahn’s model, competitive firms minimise total costs by setting the marginal cost 
of abatement to the permit price (Montgomery, 1972). With increasing marginal 
costs of pollution abatement, the competitive firms’ permit demand is then inversely 
related to the permit price, i.e., the competitive permit demand function is down­
6 Montero (1997) qualifies the competitive outcome when there are transaction costs and uncertainty.
ward sloping. For competitive firms the permit demand is independent of the initial 
permit distribution, but this is not the case for a firm with market power. Hahn’s 
key result is that if the dominant firm does not initially receive the permit alloca­
tion “it holds in equilibrium” , total abatement costs will exceed the cost-minimising 
level, i.e., the efficient allocation of permits (where marginal costs of abatement are 
equated across firms and, therefore, with the permit price) is only achieved where 
the initial permit distribution coincides with the distribution after trade. In other 
words, if the initial permit distribution is efficient, then there is no trading, but 
if it is inefficient, it will not be fully corrected through trading. Hahn then shows 
that both the dominant firm’s permit demand and the equilibrium permit price are 
increasing in the firm’s initial allocation, and that allocative inefficiency after trad­
ing increases as the initial permit allocation deviates from the efficient allocation 
(in either direction). Halm assumes compliance on the part of both dominant and 
competitive firms and he does not consider the possibility that the dominant firm 
may choose to hold excess permits.
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Misiolek and Elder (1989) characterise the type of permit market failure examined 
by Hahn (1984) as “cost-minimising manipulation” or CMM. Their analysis of CMM 
uses a similar model to Hahn’s and produces similar results. They note that any 
deviation from an efficient permit allocation is sufficient to enable a dominant firm 
to exercise either monopoly or monopsony power and that any “aftertrade” that 
takes place following the initial permit allocation will always reduce, though not 
eliminate, the inefficiency of the initial allocation.
The principal focus of Misiolek’s and Elder’s paper is what they term “exclusionary 
manipulation” of pollution rights or EM, whereby firms seek to raise rivals’ costs or 
to deter new entrants to the industry. The prerequisites are that a firm has market 
dominance in both the permit market and a product market served by the same firms 
that make up the permit market. In Misiolek’s and Elder’s model there is a cost 
advantage to producing the product in a particular area and pollution permits are, 
de facto, necessary in order to be able to produce within that area. Assuming that 
output by the competitive firms is sensitive to the permit price as well as the output
10
price, it is shown that the output price is increasing in the dominant firm’s demand 
for permits. The dominant firm’s net impact upon the product price through its 
own permit demand, hence the “exclusionary value” of a permit (in addition to the 
value of a permit in terms of abatement costs), then depends upon (a) the fringe 
inverse demand for permits, (b) the response of the fringe’s product supply to the 
permit price, (c) the elasticity of the market demand for the product and (d) the 
elasticity of the fringe’s product supply with respect to the product price.7
Misiolek and Elder find that with the exercise of monopsony power, the dominant 
firm always demands more permits than in the case of CMM alone, and may even 
demand more than the efficient allocation. With monopoly power in the permit 
market, the dominant firm always sells fewer permits than in the case of CMM 
alone, and may even become a net purchaser of permits. Here, however, inefficiency 
is everywhere increased compared to CMM alone. EM, therefore, always results in
7 These results are consistent with the more general results of Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987). See also 
Sartzetakis (1997a).
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an increased demand for permits by the dominant firm. Like Hahn (1984), Misiolek 
and Elder assume compliance and do not consider the possibility that the dominant 
firm may hold more permits than its level of pollution requires.
Malueg (1990) also examines the implications of degrees of competition in related 
output markets for the overall welfare impacts of pollution permit markets. Assum­
ing that emissions trading reduces firms’ net marginal costs of production, Malueg 
argues that when both permit and output markets are competitive, (aggregate) wel­
fare can only increase with permit trading, since lower aggregate marginal costs 
implies increased output. However, with a competitive market for permits, but 
(Cournot) oligopoly in an output market, Malueg shows (through graphical rep­
resentation) that it is possible for any gain in consumers’ surplus to be offset, or 
more than offset, by a loss in industry profits as a result of a reallocation of output 
from low cost to high cost firms through permit trading (the extent of which de­
pends, presumably, on the initial permit allocation as well as on firms’ production 
costs). This conclusion is challenged by Sartzetakis (1997b), who finds that permit
12
trading is always welfare-improving. Sartzetakis (2004), on the other hand, finds 
that if firms’ technological efficiencies in production and abatement are positively 
correlated, permit trading could be welfare-reducing and even output-decreasing.8
In a more rigorous mathematical analysis, Innes, Kling and Rubin (1991) explore 
the welfare implications of imperfect competition in both output and permit mar­
kets. Their setting is an output/permit market monopolist and a competitive fringe 
(though here producing in different output markets). It is shown that for the mo­
nopolist a second-best emissions level exists, such that its lower than competitive 
marginal abatement cost optimally compensates for the deadweight monopoly wel­
fare loss (lower marginal costs resulting in higher output). To achieve this second- 
best outcome with tradeable permits (it cannot be achieved with a uniform pollution 
tax), the dominant firm should initially be over-endowed with permits so that it be­
haves as a monopolist in the permit market. Here, the monopolist sets its marginal
8 These results do, however, depend upon some rather restrictive assumptions about firms’ cost functions 
(Sartzetakis, 1997b, 2004).
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revenue from permit sales, rather than the permit price, equal to its marginal cost of 
abatement.9 The “wedge” between the permit price and the dominant firm’s mar­
ginal revenue from permits is here key to the welfare-maximising outcome. In theory, 
this solution extends to monopolists in multiple output markets and to oligopoly in 
the permit and output markets. Contrary to Malueg’s (1990) conclusion, therefore, 
a permit system could be welfare-enhancing in the case of an oligopoly, although 
the heavy informational burden on a regulator seeking to use this is noted. Again, 
both Malueg (1990) and Innes, Kling and Rubin assume the equivalence of permit 
demands and emission levels.
With a paper by Malik (1990) we now turn to the literature on non-compliance and 
enforcement in pollution permit regimes. Following the development of a literature 
on non-compliance and enforcement relating to pollution standards and taxes (in 
particular Downing and Watson, 1974, and Harford, 1978), Beavis and Walker (1983)
9 Comparative static results show th a t the dom inant firm’s output and final perm it dem and are both 
increasing in its initial perm it endowment.
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published the first formal analysis of non-compliance with pollution permits. They
examined the effects of a regulator’s monitoring effort upon the behaviour of firms 
with stochastic pollutant discharges, concluding that the frequency of monitoring 
affects the level of pollutant discharge when discharges are stochastic, but not when 
they are deterministic.
Malik (1990) rejects this latter conclusion in his study of the impact of non-compliance 
upon permit demands and the properties of the permit market at equilibrium. His 
main conclusion is that non-compliance alters firms’ permit demands and hence the 
equilibrium permit price, most likely downward although he does not rule out the 
possibility of permit prices being increased by non-compliance (see below). From an 
expected utility of profit maximisation problem of the form
max Ui (7rf) , 7n =
Bi (wi) — r [s< -  sj] if Si>W i,
Bi (Wi) -  r [Si -  sj] -  Fi (vh S) if S i< w i ,
Malik derives the following optimal decision rule:
B[ O ')  =  r +  q>t (i)
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where
7T? =  Bi (w*) - r [ s * ~  sj] , 7rj =  tt? -  F{ (v{, 8)
and
i _  dPi fy i
9i ~  dwi d s f
Here, Bi (wz) is a (social) benefit function, strictly concave in Wi, the firm’s emissions 
level, r is the short run permit (rental) price, sz is the firm’s permit demand, with 
s? its initial permit allocation, ®  (-+, 8) is the expected fine as a function of the 
violation Vi =  wz — sz and a vector of exogenous penalty policy parameters S, and 
Pi =  pi (u>i,Si] 19) is the audit probability, with 9 a vector of exogenous audit policy 
parameters. In the case of a risk neutral firm (or if the problem is defined at the 
outset in terms of expected profits), expression (1) becomes simply
B'i (wi) =  r +  faFi (.)
and if the audit probability pi (.) is a constant then the decision rule is B[ (-wz) =  r, 
the same as for a compliant firm, which also mirrors Harford’s (1978) condition for 
a non-compliant firm facing a pollution tax. Malik concludes, however, that this 
will also hold where the audit probability is a function of the violation size, defined
16
in level terms (u>i — s*). In either case, the emissions level of a non-compliant firm is 
then the same as that of an otherwise identical compliant firm, which implies that 
the non-compliant firm’s permit demand must be lower. Given market-clearing, this 
in turn implies that the equilibrium permit price must be lower in a non-compliant 
industry. In general, though, the presence of the term means that the relationship 
between B[ (wi) and r is ambiguous. Then, Malik observes “one cannot rule out the 
perverse possibility that the equilibrium permit price in a non-compliant market 
is higher than in a compliant market” (p. 102). Finally, he notes that with non- 
compliance, permit markets are only efficient (in a second-best sense) when (pi — 0, 
otherwise, marginal profits are not equated across firms. Following Malik (1990), 
Andreasson-Gren (1992) also concludes that the permit price is reduced by non- 
compliance.
Keeler (1991) considers the importance of the shape of the (expected) penalty func­
tion facing firms in a permit market, assuming that expected penalties depend purely 
upon the size of the violation (defined, again, in level terms). Here, though, Keeler
17
does not allow expected marginal penalties to vary across firms. The effect of con­
stant marginal expected penalties is equivalent to that of a flat rate unit pollution 
tax and the marginal expected penalty then forms a ceiling to the market equilib­
rium permit price. With expected penalties increasing in the (level) violation size, 
all firms comply as long as the permit price is less than the expected penalty for the 
initial unit of violation, but otherwise the impact of non-compliance on the equilib­
rium permit price is not explored. Although expected marginal penalties decreasing 
in the violation size are considered unlikely, here the expected penalty for the initial 
unit of violation forms a ceiling to the permit price and a firm’s permit demand is 
either the compliant demand or zero, depending upon the (negative) slope of the 
expected penalty function.
Von der Fehr (1993) returns to the question of imperfect competition in permit mar­
kets (assuming compliance). He considers a duopoly in an emissions permit market 
where two symmetric, quantity setting (Cournot) firms also have market power in 
an output market. He derives comparative statics for the effect of redistributing
18
permits from a smaller to a larger firm on total industry profits and concludes that 
industry profits will be maximised where all permits are reallocated to the larger firm 
if products are homogenous, the cost function is sub-additive in outputs and permit 
demands (i.e., there are economies of scale) and emissions permits are essential to 
profitable operations (i.e., abatement costs are substantial). Von der Fehr argues 
that permit markets may then provide an instrument for industry monopolisation 
if the (residual) supply of permits is inelastic, so that new entries are effectively 
prevented. The implications for total welfare are examined. Depending on the 
economies of scale that exist, welfare effects are ambiguous, according to whether 
increases in firm profits outweigh decreases in consumers’ surplus or vice versa. The 
model is then extended to explore further more complex strategic interaction (e.g., 
commitment and investment in a two-stage game).
Westskog (1996) also considers oligopoly in an emissions permit market, although 
here comitries, not firms, participate in the market as Cournot players with a com­
petitive fringe of price taking countries. His findings essentially follow those of Halm
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(1984) for a single dominant player, then show that (given certain restrictions) the 
sign of the relationship between total costs and the initial permit allocation depends 
on whether the dominant firms acquire monopoly or monopsony power as a result.
The first analysis of market power and non-compliance in permit markets is due 
to van Egteren and Weber (1996), who consider the impact of market power on 
equilibrium permit prices and levels of compliance. Their main finding is that when 
a firm has market power in the permit market, the initial permit allocation is of 
fundamental importance in determining prices and levels of compliance for all par­
ticipants in the market, with consequent implications for total social costs. The 
effect of redistributing permits from the competitive fringe to a dominant firm is to 
increase the permit price. An increase in the dominant firm’s initial permit endow­
ment then produces an miambiguous increase in both global violations and emissions 
if the dominant firm is compliant (violations increase but emissions decrease in the 
competitive fringe). If the dominant firm is non-compliant, however, increasing its 
initial allocation leads to increased violations and decreased emissions in the fringe
20
but a decrease in violation and an increase in emissions by the dominant firm. Thus 
the global effect is ambiguous (i.e., parameter specific).
Van Egteren and Weber suggest that the main policy implication is that the initial 
allocation to the dominant firm can be adjusted to increase its violations and de­
crease those of the competitive fringe. Costly enforcement effort can then be focused 
on the dominant firm to force it into compliance. When the dominant firm is forced 
to be compliant, reducing its permit endowment unambiguously increases net social 
benefits (i.e., aggregate industry profits less enforcement costs and environmental 
damage costs).
In van Egteren’s and Weber’s model, risk neutral firms maximise
Bi(et) — P  [ k  — / ? ] -  f t
where e* are emissions, U is the permit demand, I9 is the initial permit allocation, 
P  is the equilibrium permit price, j3{ (vi) is the (successful) audit probability as a 
function of the violation vz =  ez — li >  0 and F{ (vi) is the fine. Given that violations
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are defined in level terms, comparative statics yield
and
de* dl*
—A  < 0  — <  0
dP ' dP
Then
dv* _  de* dl*
dP ~  ~dP ~  dP
>  0.
dv* _  dv* dP _  dv* 
'd ^  =  ~ d P ' d ^ ^ d P
,P 'dA
oil j
> o ,
where is the initial permit allocation to the dominant firm and we have P  =
P (L — li) , where L is the total supply of permits. Given that P' <  0, the sign
dv* dl*
of depends upon the sign of which is found to be unambiguously positive
when the dominant firm is compliant, irrespective of whether it is a net buyer or a
dv* de* dl*
net seller of permits. Note that >  0 implies that <  0 and <  0.
When the dominant firm is non-compliant, van Egteren’s and Weber’s comparative
statics yield
de\ dl\ _ dvt
W ,  >’ s i ? >  ’ si? ’
so that the net impact of changes in on global emissions and violations is am­
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biguous, depending upon “the relative shapes of the firm-specific benefit and fine 
functions” (p. 169). The possibility of a solution where e\ <  so that the dominant 
firm chooses to hold excess permits, is not considered.
Malik (2002) reviews and extends van Egteren’s and Weber’s (1996) analysis, using 
their basic model and notation. Denoting Sz (u2) =  /?• (v{) Fz (vi) as the expected 
penalty as an increasing function of a firm’s violation Vi =  e* — li >  0, following 
Malik (1990) a competitive non-compliant firm maximises expected profits with the 
decision rule
B\ (<*) =
as does a compliant firm (so that, in the case of identical firms, both produce the 
same level of emissions e*). Here, for the compliant firm (denoted by the superscript
c),
ei (P) =  lHP) =  B'r1 (P) , 
where B(~l (P) is the inverse of B[ (ej evaluated at B[ (ej =  P. Given Malik’s 
specification of the expected penalty function, for a non-compliant firm (denoted by
23
the superscript n),
it (p) = n(p) - s'-1 (p) = (p) - srl (p),
where (P) is the inverse of the marginal expected penalty function S( (v{) eval­
uated at S[ (vi) =  P . Then the slope of the non-compliant permit demand curve is 
found as
dt? (P) d B +  (P) d S t1 (P) d B +  (P) dP; (P)
dP dP dP dP dP ’
dS--1 (P)
given that — L— —  >  0. Hence, in aggregate, the permit demand of price-taking 
dP
firms contracts and becomes more elastic with non-compliance. For a given supply 
of permits, therefore, the equilibrium permit price is everywhere lower with non- 
compliance.
For a (compliant) dominant firm, Malik confirms Hahn’s (1984) results which he 
characterises in terms of the equilibrium permit price. Thus he notes that the price 
exceeds the first-best price when the dominant firm has monopoly power in the 
permit market and is less than the first-best price when the firm has monopsony
24
power.10 However, he also finds that if the initial permit allocation to the dominant 
firm is sufficiently large, the firm will retire permits, i.e., hold permits in excess of 
its emissions level. Here, B[ (e™) — 0, where e™ is the firm’s maximum emissions 
level, but the monopolist’s marginal revenue from permit sales,
p + p ' l i i - h ] ,
is negative where h =  e™ (although, at the optimum, we have P-\~P' [Z° — h] = 0  and 
h >  ej1). The firm will not retire permits by purchasing them from the competitive 
fringe: when it exercises monopsony power in the permit market, we always have 
li =  e\.
Since, in Malik’s model, with non-compliance competitive firms’ quota demands be­
come smaller and more elastic, non-compliance in the competitive fringe reduces 
the dominant firm’s monopoly power and may increase social benefits as the diver­
10 M aeda (2003) notes th a t the condition for monopoly power is tha t, in the initial perm it allocation, a 
player receives excess perm its greater than  the excess demand in the rem ainder of the market. Eshel 
(2005) considers efficient (full-information) criteria for the allocation of perm its when some firms have 
m arket power.
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gence between firms’ marginal benefit of emissions (and hence marginal abatement 
costs) is reduced. This is set against the environmental damage costs from in­
creased emissions. Using the example of a constant marginal damage function, he 
shows that overall net benefits may indeed increase due to non-compliance by the 
competitive firms. In order to do this, Malik examines the marginal impact of fringe 
non-compliance on the dominant firm’s permit holdings and the equilibrium permit
price by applying a scaling factor a G [0,1] to the violation size 5 + 1 (P).11 He
dP
then finds that we always have <  0 when the dominant firm exercises monopoly
dP
power in the permit market, but that the sign of —— is ambiguous in the case
o a
dl
of monopsony power. At the same time, the sign of —  is ambiguous when the
Oa
dominant firm exercises monopoly power, but when it exercises monopsony power, 
introducing some fringe non-compliance unambiguously raises its permit holdings,
? > o .
d a
Malik finds that non-compliance by the dominant firm lowers its permit holding
11 No economic meaning is provided for a, however.
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and increases its emissions. He identifies no conditions under which this might 
be also socially desirable, however. In contrast to van Egteren and Weber (1996), 
Malik concludes that the social impact of altering the dominant firm’s initial permit 
endowment remains ambiguous even in the case where the firm is compliant and has 
monopoly power in the permit market.
Further to the above, mechanisms for the efficient (initial) allocation of permits are 
considered by Lyon (1982, 1986), Sunnevag (2003) and Eshel (2005). The optimal 
regulatory design for the enforcement of tradeable permits is addressed by Beavis 
and Walker (1983), Malik (1992), Stranlund and Dhanda (1999), Stranlund and 
Chavez (2000), Chavez and Stranlund (2003), Innes (2003), Mrozek and Keeler 
(2004), Stranlund, Costello and Chavez (2005) and Stranlund (2007).
Beyond the scope of the present study, there is also a literature on dynamic models 
of emission permit markets, in particular where there are provisions for banking 
and borrowing of permits, i.e., postponing emissions to the next period or bringing
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emissions forward to the current period when permits are issued as a stock allowance. 
Banking and borrowing in a competitive market leads to an efficient distribution of 
pollution abatement across time as well as across firms (Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996, 
Rubin, 1996, Kling and Rubin, 1997, Yates and Cronshaw, 2001). Imies (2003) 
considers the enforcement of compliance in a dynamic market, Liski and Montero 
(2005, 2006) consider the strategies of (compliant) dominant firms with banking 
of permits. Hagem and Westskog (1998) show that a “durable quota system” (in 
which pollution permits confer rights to emit over more than one period) can reduce 
the within-period adverse welfare effects of market power in the permit market, 
although there is then a non-optimal distribution of pollution abatement across 
periods (which is not the case with banking and borrowing). Finally, from a public 
finance perspective, Laffont and Tirole (1996) consider non-compliance, investment 
behaviour and optimal pollution control in a dynamic analysis of permit markets.
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1.3 Motivation for the current research
The research contained in this thesis was, in a general sense, motivated principally 
by the relative paucity of theoretical studies on non-compliance and market power in 
ITQ markets and the possibility that the basic results from the literature on pollution 
permit markets might not be sufficient on their own fully to describe markets for fish 
quotas. In addition, and more specifically, in the context of the impact of cheating 
the research was motivated by the hypothesis that non-compliance with quotas 
(if not non-compliance with pollution permits as well) might more realistically be 
modelled by specifying expected penalties as a fmiction of relative violations rather 
than absolute (level) violations of quota demands. In the context of market power, 
as we have seen, ITQ markets differ from those for pollution permits in that ITQs 
directly define rights over production of a marketable good, yet only one short study 
has looked at the simultaneous exercise of market power in quota and output markets 
by a dominant fishing firm. The research therefore attempted to analyse this issue 
more thoroughly than had previously been the case. Finally, the research sought
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to combine analysis of market power with non-compliance, here using models of 
cheating based upon relative violations. The aim throughout was to derive results
which are general and not reliant on the specification of particular functional forms.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The following chapter sets out a simple model of profit maximising firm behaviour 
under ITQ regulation and establishes the basic results for compliant competitive 
firms in a single species ITQ fishery in a static setting. This model forms the 
starting point for all the analysis in this thesis and in its structure closely resembles 
models of firm behaviour in a market for pollution permits (e.g., Malik 2002).
Chapter 3 then presents an analysis of non-compliance with quotas and the im­
plications of non-compliance for the properties of quota markets. The setting is 
again static and all firms are here assumed to be competitive. Using a model of 
non-compliant firm behaviour with expected penalties for non-compliance depen-
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dent upon level violations, the analysis firstly rehearses results previously obtained 
for pollution permit markets. We then examine the implications of assuming instead 
that firms5 expectations of penalties for non-compliance depend upon their relative 
violations of quota demands. Based upon comparative static analysis, we find that 
on this basis the impact of non-compliance upon individual firm’s quota demands 
and on the industry (aggregate) inverse quota demand can be quite different to that 
predicted by “level violation” models.
In Chapter 4 we examine the behaviour of a firm with market power in the quota 
market, now assuming that all firms are compliant. We firstly consider a single 
dominant firm, faced by a competitive fringe, where the firm has market power in 
the quota market alone before turning to the case of a dominant firm with market 
power in both the quota market and the output market. Here the results are found to 
be less straightforward than in a previously published study (Anderson 1991). The 
results from both preceding parts of the chapter are then reviewed in an oligopoly 
setting. In Chapter 5 we then examine the impact of market power when firms are
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non-compliant, firstly assuming that only the dominant firm is cheating and then 
looking at a compliant or non-compliant dominant firm faced with a non-compliant 
fringe. Here we consider the effect of fringe non-compliance on the dominant firm’s 
quota demand and its decision whether or not to hold quota off the market or 
to cheat. Even with a very simple model, in the case of a dominant firm with 
market power in both quota and output markets, introducing non-compliance in the 
competitive fringe can make it very difficult to obtain unambiguous results.
Finally, Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the results and considers directions for 
future research.
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2. The basic fishing firm model
2.1 Introduction
This short chapter sets out the simple firm/industry model which forms the basis 
for all the analysis in this thesis. As stated in the previous chapter, the functional 
forms in the model are kept general in order to maintain generality in the results.
We consider a single species, single product, fishery at a single point in time. In 
this static model, we assume that the fish stock biomass is fixed and constant and 
therefore does not enter explicitly into the profit function. There are a total of N  
fishing vessels in the fishery, indexed i =  1,2, ..7V, each operated as an independent 
profit-maximising firm. Each fishing firm may be considered to operate a single 
fishing vessel. Unless otherwise specified, all firms are competitive, i.e., they behave 
as price takers in both output (catch) and quota markets (as well as, implicitly in 
the model, in other input markets). To begin with, we also assume that firms are
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quota compliant.
2.2 The model
For the ith vessel firm, short run gross profits, i.e., short run profits before any 
payments for quota (or fines for non-compliance with quotas), are given by the 
(social) benefit fimction Bz (eQ where
Bi (e*) =  pq{ (ei) -  q (e*) . (1)
Here the catch qz (e^ ) is a weakly concave function of a composite variable input 
(winch we can think of as fishing “effort”) and variable costs c* (e*) are strictly 
convex in e*. With an output price p (exogenous to the fishery unless otherwise 
stated) we have Bz (e*) strictly concave in e*. Given this, in the absence of quotas 
short run profits are maximised where
B'i (et) =  pqt (et) -  cj (e*) =  0. (2)
For convenience, however, we will assume throughout that catch is a deterministic 
function of effort, so that we can treat catch rather than effort as the firm’s choice
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variable. Thus we have
Bi (qi) = pqi -  a (qi) , (3)
where Bi (qi) is strictly concave in qi. This simplifies the necessary condition for 
profit maximisation to
B '(9 * )= p -c ( (? * )  =  0. (4)
In a given period, the fishery manager sets a total catch quota, or Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC), for the fishery, denoted by O. Quota is freely (i.e., costlessly) traded 
between firms and each firm demands an amount of quota Q* >  0 at market equilib-
N
rium where, necessarily, ^  Q* <  Cl, although, unless otherwise stated, it is assumed
2=1
throughout that the quota market clears. Thus we have the general market clearing 
condition
N
E Q i  =  n - (s)
2=1
A quota compliant firm, i.e., a firm which always chooses Q* >  q* irrespective of any 
pecuniary incentive to do otherwise, then faces the short run profit maximisation
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problem
max 7n =  Bi (qf) -  rQi s.t. q{ >  0, Qi >  0, Qi >  qiy (6)
QiiQi
where r is the short run (rental) price of quota. Note that the firm’s initial allocation 
of quota is assumed to be zero wherever, as here, the quota price is parametric to 
the firm.1 The corresponding Lagrangian function is
C =  Bi (q^ -  rQi -  Ai (qi -  Qi) (7)
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are
Cq =  B'i ( q * ) - X i <  0, q * >  0, Cqq* =  0, (8a)
Tq — —r + A; < 0, Q *>  0, CqQ* =  0, (8b)
£x =  -qi +  Q i > 0 , A* > 0 ,  Cx\*i=0.  (8c)
For q* =  Q* >  0, we have the necessary first-order conditions
(«,*) =  A, (9)
and
r =  A i. (10)
1 In this case a non-zero initial quota allocation makes no difference to the profit-maximising behaviour 
of the firm.
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B 'M )  =  r, (11)
i.e., the compliant competitive firm sets its marginal benefit of output equal to the 
quota rental price.
Solving (9) and (10) for A* yields the basic decision rule for a compliant firm
The quota demand Q* (r) of a compliant firm at a quota price r is then simply given 
the inverse of the marginal benefit function £• (qz) evaluated at B[ (q*) — r, so that
Qi W  =  «? (r) =  B '-1 (r). (12)
Hence, we can find
i . i u n . B - - ( . ) < » ,  ( .3 )
where BJ7-1 (.) is the slope of B 'f1 (.) in B[ (qi).2
Figure 2.1 illustrates a compliant competitive firm’s (inverse) quota demand in linear 
form (quadratic costs).
2 We assume that, for all qi >  0, the function B[ (qi) has an inverse B\ 1 (.) =  qi (+ ) •  Note tha t, by the 
inverse function rule, we then have B "~ x (.) =  1 /B " (q i ) .
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Fig. 2.1. Competitive firm quota demand
While the quota price r is parametric to the firm, it is endogenous to the indus­
try (fishery), with the fishery quota demand formed by horizontal aggregation of 
individual firm demands. In a fishery in which all firms are quota compliant, the 
equilibrium quota price will be determined according to (11). The total fishery de-
N  N
mand for quota at a price f  is given by Jf, Qi (f) an-d if Qi 00 — ^ then f  is the
i—1 i—1
market-clearing (equilibrium) quota price. Given the concavity of B[ (qf) , follow­
ing (13) the fishery inverse quota demand r (Q) is decreasing in Q and is zero, we
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assume, if Cl is just equal to (or greater than) the unconstrained optimal industry 
output, denoted to*. Thus, if
w* =  X > +  =  ° ) ’ (14)
i=l
then we have
r (Cl >  u*) =  0, r (Cl <  co*) >  0, r' (Cl) <  0. (15)
Fig. 2.2. Competitive industry inverse quota demand
Figure 2.2 illustrates the competitive industry inverse quota demand r (Q) for linear
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firm demand curves.
In the following chapter, the model is extended to the case of non-compliant firms 
by including an expected penalty term in the objective function.
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3. Modelling non-compliance with quotas
3.1 Introduction
We now extend the basic model outlined in Chapter 2 to incorporate firms’ non- 
compliance with quota demands. Following the literature on non-compliance with 
pollution permits, we model non-compliance in terms of expected penalties for vio­
lation. After considering the basic non-compliant firm model in some detail, we pro­
ceed to examine the implications for non-compliant firms’ quota demands of different 
specifications of the expected penalty function, in particular expected penalties de­
pendent upon relative violations of quota demands in contrast to the level violation 
models found almost universally in the environmental regulation literature.1
1 An exception is H atcher (2007).
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3.2 The basic non-compliant firm model
A quota non-compliant firm, i.e., a firm which will choose Q* < q\ wherever it is 
profitable to do so, expects to incur a monetary penalty 6i (.) defined by
&i =  6 i  ( v i \  $ )  =  (v p , $ )  F i  (u ij  $ )
for a quota violation vif where in general V{ =  (qi, Qi), Vq* > Q*, with <f> denoting 
a representative (exogenous) enforcement parameter. The components of Bi (,) are 
the expected probability of detection <fi (.) and a monetary fine Fi (.) incurred if 
detected. We assume that Fi (.) is exactly known to the firm, but that R («) is 
formed as a subjective response to the enforcement activities of the fishery manager 
( $ )  as well as the firm’s own violation v i t  Throughout, we will have
$ ( 0 > 0 ,  F ' ( , ) >  0,
although we will require that
i.e., for any violation marginal expected penalties are always strictly positive. Note
dO- ( )
that here B\ (.) denotes * —, similarly for f>i (») and F[ (■). We also assume that,
O
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all else equal,
M W >  0 M W >  o
93- ' 94>
and hence
M W > 0  M W  > 0
9$  ’ 9$  ’
i.e., increasing enforcement effort increases the subjective probability of detection
and hence increases the expected marginal penalty for any given violation.
For a price-taking firm, the short run, risk-neutral, expected profit maximisation 
problem (<f> given) is then
max 7n ~  Bi (qi) -  rQi -  9i (vt) s.t. >  0, Q* >  0. (16)
qi,Qi
The corresponding Lagrangian is
L  =  Bi (q^ -  rQi -  9{ (vf) (17)
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are
C q =  B [  (g*) -  - i ~ U  <  0, q - >  0, C t < £  =  0, (18a)
£ Q =  - r ~ - j ^ < 0 ,  Q * >  0, £ qQ: =  0. (18b)
For q* >  Qi >  0, i.e., a choice of $  in violation of the quota demand Q* >  0, we
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have the first-order necessary conditions
B 'i{<£) =  (19)
and
Subtracting (20) from (19) and rearranging yields the combined decision rule
B ' M ) = r  +
ddi (v't) +  ddi (v*)
(21)
dqi dQi
Equation (21) states that, at the optimum, the marginal benefit of increasing the 
catch is equated with the sum of the quota price and the net change in the expected 
penalty from marginal increases in catch and quota demand. Note that we could, 
equivalently, write (21) as
P '(n -)  r ' 9 9 i I^"'"’!
*  ^  a ^ ~  ~ 9 q ~ ’  ( 2 2 )
so that the LHS is the (expected) net benefit of a marginal increase in catch and 
the RHS is the (expected) net cost of a marginal increase in quota demand (both 
sides, of course, are equal to zero at the optimum).
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3.2.1 Defining the violation argument in the expected penalty function
We will later go on to consider the implications of two alternative definitions of the 
violation argument Vi. While it is conventional in the literature to define in level 
terms, i.e., here as vz =  qz — Qi, violations could instead be defined in relative terms, 
i.e., Vi =  ^  Q"1 or (equivalently for analytical purposes) vz =
The functions fa («) and F{ («) need not contain the same violation arguments, how­
ever. For example, the fine might be determined by the level violation of a firm’s 
quota demand, whereas the (subjective) probability of detection may depend upon 
the relative violation. If this were the case, then we would have (suppressing the 4> 
argument) (a) =  ^  Ft (<& -  Qi), so that
and
m (.) f q i \ d F i ( ® - g f) , ( g j  „ ,
=   S g r ..+  T ' R (* _ < w
=  - ^  ( J? (» -  OO -  ^  ( ^ J  (# -  9 0  • (24)
Substituting (23) and (24) into (21) we get
L<3* Q f
(25)
In the more general case where the violation argument in (.) is left undefined, this
is equivalent to
d<t>i ( . )  d<j>i ( 0  I „  n
T + ^ o r '  <(,)’
(26)
which (in my notation) mirrors the result Malik (1990) finds for a risk-neutral firm
in a pollution permit market (see below).
If, on the other hand, the fine were determined by the relative violation of quota
demands, whereas the (subjective) probability of detection were to depend upon the
level violation, then we would have
=  r +  & ( * - < ? < ) * ?  ( | A
Q'i
(27)
which is formally similar to (25). If both (.) and Fz (.) were functions of relative
46
violations, we would have
B ' i ( q t ) = r  + Qi
Qi) 1 \Qi)  ^  \Qi \Q
Q i \ j p  Qi J _ _  j L
QI Qf,
(28)
In each case, expression (25), (27) or (28) could be written more succinctly as
£{(<£)  = r  +  6>U0
QI O f J
(29)
where B\ (.) is the marginal expected penalty for a marginal change in the rela-
QB • ( )  q-
tive violation, i.e., 1 where Vi =  Note that here q* >  Q* implies that
OV{ Kttfi
L _ j L  
IQt J
<  0 and hence B[ (q*) <  r. We will return to this later.
If both (.) and Fi (.) were functions of level violations, however, then we would
have
dBi (qi Qi) dBi (qi Qi) i  / \ p / /  \ , i / n p / \   ^ \ ^  m  j.i t \ n  t \ 
+  —   =  <Pi (0  F i (■) +  <Pi (0  Fi (■) -  4>i (■) Fi (.) -  fa (.) Fi (.)
9qi dQi
=  0. (30)
Thus if (pi («) and F{ (.) are both functions of the level violation Vi =  qi — Qi >  0,
expression (21) collapses to B\ (q*) =  r, which, as we have seen, is the decision
rule for a compliant firm. In essence, this was the result found by Malik (1990) for
tradeable emissions permits, although here we can perhaps see more clearly that
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Specifically, for a non-compliant firm to produce according to B[ (q*) =  r requires
that both the subjective probability of detection (.) and the known fine if detected
Fi (.) are either constant (so that =  =  0 and F jFL  =  ^ + 1  =  0) 0r
dqi dQi dqi dQi
a function of the level violation. Otherwise, B[ (q*) ^  r, i.e., a non-compliant firm 
does not equate its marginal benefit of production with the quota price.
it rests upon some rather strict assumptions about the expected penalty function.
While Malik (1990), in the context of emissions permits, notes from equation (26) 
that in general B[ (») 7  ^r (in my notation), he concludes that B'{ („) — r does hold 
for a non-compliant firm if the subjective probability of sanction (as well as the fine) 
depends on the violation size, since he defines this in level terms.
3.3 Non-compliance and quota demands
In a fishery in which all firms are non-compliant, the formation of the equilibrium 
short run quota price will be determined in accordance with (2 1 ) and thus will
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depend upon the properties of the enforcement system as well as firms’ gross profit
from the marginal unit of catch. As we have seen, however, if the expected penalty 
for a quota violation is purely a function of the level violation Vi =  qi -* Qi, then 
each firm will optimise according to (q*) =  r, as is the case for a compliant 
firm. Since, by definition, for a given total quota supply non-compliance results in 
increased industry output, this suggests that, under some conditions at least, both 
firms’ marginal gross profit at the optimum output and the equilibrium quota price 
must be equally sensitive to the degree of non-compliance and hence the properties 
of the enforcement system. Malik (1990) makes a similar observation in the context 
of an emissions permit market.
We look, firstly, at the case of expected penalties which increase linearly, and then 
non-linearly, in the level violation size, before turning to the case of expected penal­
ties which are a function of the relative size of the violation, which I argue may be 
a more realistic assumption.
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3.3 .1 Constant expected marginal penalties as a function of level 
violations
Consider the case of a. constant expected marginal penalty, 8\ (vi) >  0 ,8" (vf) =  
0, deriving, perhaps, from a system of wholly random (but extremely thorough) 
inspections, resulting in a constant A  ($), and a fine that increases linearly in the 
level size of any violation (Ff (cp — Qi) =  0). Here we have <j/{ (.) Fi (.) =  0 and hence
(■) =  &  (■) (•) >  0.
As Keeler (1991) notes for the comparable case in pollution permit markets, under 
these conditions no rational firm will pay more for a unit of quota than 8\ (vf) (in 
my notation) and this will have an impact on the equilibrium quota price. Clearly, 
individual firms will choose Q* =  0 if r >  8'{ (vf) and Q* =  q* if r <  6'i (iQ. If 
r =  8\ (vi) then the firm will be indifferent between cheating and buying quota and 
will have an unpredictable quota demand, although here we could follow convention 
and assume compliance. At market equilibrium, therefore, if 8\ (vi) is assumed to 
be firm-specific, we may have some firms with 8\ (vf) <  r and zero quota demands 
and some firms with Q\ (yf) >  r who will be in compliance. Note that since we must
have 9\ (vi) >  r when Q* >  0, the decision rule B\ (qf) — r holds for all firms with 
non-zero quota demands, B\ (qf) — 9\ (vf) otherwise.
Assuming market clearing, the industry’s inverse quota demand r  (Q) will then equal 
that of an industry in which all firms are compliant when 9\ (n j  >  r  (O) for all firms, 
but will be lower when 6[ (v{) < r  (Cl) for at least some firms. Since here some firms 
are strictly cheating instead of buying quota, demand will become more price elastic 
and r (Q) will become less elastic (with respect to Q) than in an otherwise identical 
compliant fishery, i.e., the equilibrium quota price will be less responsive to changes 
in the TAC and always lower than in a compliant fishery. Note that if we had 
6' (=) the same for all firms, then O' (■) would simply form a ceiling to the quota 
price (Keeler 1991). All else equal, the equilibrium quota price r  (f2) would then be 
determined as in a compliant industry where O is such that r  (Q) <  O' („), but for 
any Q lower than this the quota price would remain fixed at 9' (.).
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Fig. 3.1. Constant expected marginal penalties
In Figure 3.1, we assume that at point a the compliant quota price would exceed 
(vi) for at least some firms, so that to the left of this point the industry inverse 
demand curve becomes less elastic.
3.3 .2  Expected marginal penalties increasing in level violations
Now consider an expected marginal penalty which increases in the level violation size,
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possibly due to an increasingly punitive fine schedule for larger violations (F" (vi) >
0), so that d'i (■) >  0, 6" (v^ >  0. Note that the second order sufficient conditions 
for expected profit maximisation are here
4 ,  =  B'l(q() -  ^ 1 1  =  (9?) _  fljr <  0 (31)
and
d26■(v?)
= --------------------=  {vt) <  0, (32)
both of which are satisfied if 6” (v?) >  0.
For the ith firm, the optimal quota demand at a quota price r is the optimal level 
of catch q* less the optimal violation level v* =  q* — Q|, which is given by the 
inverse of the expected marginal penalty function evaluated at r (since we have
B'i (q!) =  0,i {v i )=r) .  Thus
Qi M  =  qi (r) -  v* (r) =  B 'f1 (r) -  ffp  (r ) . (33)
We can now find the slope of the firm’s quota demand curve as
dQt (r) =  dB’r 1 (r) cWr1 (r)
dr dr dr
= Br1 (■) - E E  < °- (34)
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Since, given the assumptions about the slope of the expected penalty function, 
d0'~^  (r)
we know that — l—  >  0, expression (34) implies that here the non-compliant
firm’s quota demand is everywhere more elastic than that of an otherwise identical 
compliant firm. This result follows that of Malik (2002) for tradeable emissions 
permits.2 The non-compliant firm’s quota demand is depicted in Figure 3.2 below. 
Note that, by definition, a non-compliant firm’s catch exceeds its quota demand, 
which means that for a given quota price a non-compliant firm’s quota demand is 
always lower than that of an otherwise identical compliant firm. Both, however, 
produce the same level of output (where B \  (qf) — r).
2 An odd feature of the level violation model is th a t while the quota demand is decreasing in the quota 
price, all else equal the level violation is increasing in the quota price. Thus as quota demands tend to 
zero, the relative violation approaches infinity.
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Fig. 3.2. Expected penalties increasing in level violations
The non-compliant industry inverse quota demand r (Q) will then be less elastic than 
that of a compliant fishery, so that changes in the TAC produce smaller changes in 
the equilibrium quota price. Again, the optimal decision rule B[ (g*) — r holds every­
where, since at equilibrium each firm equates the quota price, its marginal benefit at 
the optimal level of catch and the expected marginal penalty for its marginal unit of 
violation. For any given TAC, the equilibrium quota price is unambiguously lower 
than in an otherwise identical compliant fishery.
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rFig. 3.3. Industry quota demand curve (level violations)
Figure 3.3 shows the industry (inverse) non-compliant quota demand (broken line) 
when expected penalties are assumed to depend upon level quota violations. For a 
given TAG (Q), the equilibrium quota price r is always lower with non-compliance.
3 .3 .3  Expected penalties as a function of relative violations
In a practical fisheries enforcement system it is arguable that the expected penalty is
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more likely to be a function of the relative size of the violation Vi =  rather
Qi
than the violation level, Vi =  qi~Qi- Fines may be relatively more severe for greater 
relative quota infringements, for example, but even with a fine schedule based upon 
level violations the expected penalty will be a function of the relative violation size if, 
as seems more likely than not, the (subjective) probability of detection and sanction 
increases with larger relative violations. Consider a system of random inspections of 
vessels’ catches or landings. If the ability of inspectors to detect quota infringements 
is imperfect, it is reasonable to suppose that larger relative violations are more likely 
to be detected than smaller ones, and that the subjective probability of detection 
will be formed on this basis.3
  Q
Let Vi =  -L——-  with 6[ (vi) >  0 and 0" (u2) >  0 . Since, as we saw previously, we
3 If the subjective probability of detection is assumed to depend only upon the level violation size, this 
implies, for example, th a t a vessel landing 1 tonne of over-quota fish has the same expectation of detection 
whether its to tal catch is 11 tonnes (a 10% violation) or 1,001 tonnes (a 0.1% violation). This appears 
unrealistic.
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now have
dqi '  Q
and
d6i M  =  e\ (Vi)±  >  0 (35)
dQi ' " ' Q l
following (29), decision rule (21) becomes
d Q i  W  n , ,  x Qi .  n / Q rN
=  ~ 6 i i V i )  7 U  <  °> ( 3 6 )
B[ (q*) =  r +  d'i (vf)
LQI Qf
(37)
Note that since ^  ^  —  1, the argument vi =  gives exactly the same
result. From the first order conditions we have the second order sufficient conditions
for a maximum as
and
Cm =  B'l(«f) -  =  B"(<f) _  g> („ .)  1 <  o (38)
=  — ^ f 2  =  - 2^  W ) ^ 3  -  *? W ) § 4  <  0. (30)
both of which are satisfied if 6” (vf) >  0 .
1 (7*
Notice again from (37) that if qf >  Qf, then —  <  —^  and hence
v i  Q/z
9 0 i(v t) dBi(y;
4----- ^ —  =  Bi (v{ )dqi dQi Qi Qf
< 0 ,
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dO ■ (v?)
so that B[ (q*) < r. Since, from the first order condition B( (q*) =  — l- —— , a non-
compliant firm produces where its marginal benefit is just equal to the expected
marginal penalty increase for the marginal unit of catch in violation, we can see
that the effect of expected penalties dependent upon relative violations is that the
marginal benefit at the optimum is always lower than the (equilibrium) quota price,
dO~ (v*s)
which from the other first order condition r —  ~ A  . [s equal to the expected
oQi
marginal reduction in the penalty from purchasing an additional unit of quota.
The significance of expected penalties dependant upon relative violations is that for
any >  0  we have
dOi (vi)
dQi
>
dOi (vi)
dqi
, i.e., at any given violation a marginal
increase in quota demand will reduce the expected penalty by more than a marginal 
increase in catch will increase the expected penalty. Thus, the firm is never indif­
ferent between the quota price and the expected marginal penalty for an increase in 
violation (i.e., between the expected marginal cost of an increase in legal or in illegal
catch) as is the case with expected penalties based upon level violations, where we
i T-. (OBi (Vi)  / . .  dOi (vf) f . .simply have -  =  ^  (vj) and - (v*).
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Notice also that now, since we have B( (q*) <  r for a non-compliant firm, for a given 
quota price a non-compliant firm always produces more than an otherwise identical 
compliant firm.
Fig. 3.4. Expected penalties as a function of relative violations
dO ■ d0 ■
In Figure 3.4 we can see that the slopes of — f  and now differ, so that we no
dQi dqi
longer have B \  (g|) =  r.
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If we take the two first-order conditions (19) and (20) and, following (35) and (36),
write them as
(40)
and
< „ )
then we can solve (40) and (41) for d\ (v*) to find
Q I H  =  s i i g )  _  .  <  x (42)
Qi (r) r
i.e., the ratio of the optimal quota demand to the optimal level of catch is the same 
as the ratio of marginal benefit at the optimal level of catch to the quota price. This 
“optimal violation ratio” is denoted here by cr*. For a compliant firm, note, (42) 
also holds, but with a* — 1. The identity in (42) leads immediately to the following 
result.
Result 3.1 With expected penalties for quota non-compliance dependent upon rel­
ative violations, the quota demand of a non-compliant firm is smaller than that of 
an otherwise identical compliant firm at relatively low quota prices but is greater at
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relatively high quota prices. There exists an interior quota price at which compliant 
and non-compliant quota demands exactly coincide.
Although perhaps not intuitive, this result can readily be verified geometrically for 
any monotonic function B[ (qi) where B'{ (qi) <  0 with B'” (qi) ^  0. For any cr* <  1, 
expression (42) implies that Q* (r) <  B 'f1 (r) for relatively small values of r but 
QUO >  B\ 1 (r) for relatively large values of r, with (r) — B\ 1 (r) at some 
intermediate r.
Figm’e 3.5 illustrates for B ( q i )  =  0 and a constant cq. If, however, the relative 
violation is not constant in the quota price, then we cannot assume that the non- 
compliant quota demand curve is everywhere less elastic. We explore this further 
below in an analysis of the comparative statics of the problem.
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Fig. 3.5. Non-compliant quota demands (constant relative violation)
3 .4  Comparative statics for the relative violation model
We now turn to the derivation of comparative statics where expected penalties are 
a function of relative violations. We look firstly at the effect of changes in the quota 
price and then at the impact of changing enforcement effort.
63
3.4.1 Increasing quota prices
If we totally differentiate the first order conditions (18a) and (18b) with respect to
qi, Qi and r, we obtain
Cqqdqf (r) +  CqQdQf (r) =  0 (43)
and
Cqqdqf (r) +  CqqdQ* (r) =  dr, (44)
which we can rearrange and write in matrix form as
dqf(r)
Cqq CqQ dr '  0  '
d-'Qq Cqq dQf(r) 1
dr
Using Cramer’s Rule, we can then find
dr |tf|
and
dQ*j (r) =  Cqq 
dr |if |
where \H\ =  CqqCQQ -  C\Q >  0 and
dqt (r) _  - C qQ <  0  (46)
<  0, (47)
r    r     d  @j ( V j )   / * \  1 . nil Qi ^  n
qQ Qq dqidQi Q f  1 ^   ^ Q f  ’ ^
given 6{ (vf) >  0. Note that here we have a simple Hessian determinant \H\ as there
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are no binding constraints. The signs of (46) and (47) are as expected, with both 
the optimal catch and the quota demand decreasing in the quota price.
(49)
Q*Since the violation ratio a* =  by the quotient rule we can also find
Qi
do* (r) =  1 dQ* Q| clq$
dr g? dr qf2 dr
and hence, substituting in (46) and (47),
do* (r) =  1 Cqq Qj CqQ
dr q.? \H\ q f  |if|
_  1 Cqq +  Cq (r) C qQ >
-  w \  <  (o0)
dct* (t*)
In general, the sign of — — , which depends upon the sign of Cqq +  a* (r) CqQ,
dcr* (7*)
appears ambiguous. If \Cqq\ >  \a* (r) CqQ| then — — J. <  q, i.e., the violation rate
dr
1 q*
=  ~  is increasing in the quota price, but if \Cqq\ <  |<r* (r) £ q q \ then we have
<n t o  Qi
da* (r)
—    >  0, i.e., the violation rate is decreasing in the quota price. If we evaluate
dr
£ qq and CqQ explicitly, we have
and
+ 3  =  W )  ^ 2  + « ?  K )  0.
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In order to interpret (50), assume, to begin with, that B[(qi) is linear in qi (i.e.,
B'f (qi) =  0) and that (yf) is linear in vz (i.e., 6" (vi) — 0). We can then see that
while B’l (q\) is constant, o\ (r) 6>- (v*) —^  (v?) •—J—  is decreasing in q* and
Qi Qi Qi
Q* and hence, from (46) and (47), is increasing in r. We would therefore expect
do"* (r)
\£qq\ >  \<J*i (r) CqQ\ and hence — —  < 0 at relatively low quota prices. This 
is intuitive, since we must have a* (r) — 1 when r — 0 (there is no incentive to
cheat when the quota price is zero). At higher quota prices, however, given that
lim (v*) •  ^ =  -+oo, we must at some point have \Cqq\ <  K M A z d  and
q,Q~* o qi (yi
da* (r)
therefore — -  >  0, i.e., the violation rate is decreasing in the quota price. This 
is also intuitive, since with expected penalties dependent upon relative violations 
the expected marginal penalties with respect to qi and Qi approach infinity as Q* 
approaches zero and hence we would expect a* (r) —> 1 as —> 0 .
do* (r)
Where j£gq| =  |<r* (r) Cqq\ then — ^----- =  0, at which point we must have a mini­
mum value of of (r) and hence a maximum relative violation. As we will see later, 
however, this is also the point at which compliant and non-compliant quota demands 
coincide. It is apparent that the linearity assumptions for B \  (q i)  and 6 i  ( v i )  can be 
relaxed without loss of generality. We can therefore state the following result.
Result 3.2 With expected penalties for quota non-compliance dependent upon rela­
tive violations, the relative violation rate is increasing in the quota price at relatively 
low quota prices but is decreasing in the quota price at relatively high quota prices. 
There exists an interior quota price at which the relative violation rate is at a max­
imum.
We can proceed to examine further the non-compliant firm’s quota demand curve 
Qf (r) as follows. From (42) we have
Qi O’) =  c* 00 Qi 00 i
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so that we can express the slope of the quota demand curve as
dQ* H  * , v dqf (r) * . . do* (r)
=  ° i +dr dr (51)
Since, from (42), we also have
we can, at the same time, find
dB\ (qf) „ dqf (r) do* (r)
— —  =  B'!(g?) =  (r) +  r—U - i ,
dr dr (52)
which then rearranges to
00 =  f
dr B'l (qf)
of (r) +  r
do* (r)
dr
(53)
Substituting from (53) into (51) we obtain
dQ U r)
dr = B ' r  (.)
CT* (r) 2 +  a'l (r) r
dal (r)
dr +  9? ( r ) ^ < 0 ,  (54)
which is signed from (47). Here, by the inverse function rule, B ” 1 (.) <  0
is the slope of the inverse of the firm’s marginal benefit in output function B\ (qi),
. . dqi (.)
equivalent to —  .—- 
dB< (qf)
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dcr* (r)
Notice that where — — - =  0, expression (54) reduces to 
dr
dQ* M  nll—l / \ * / \2
dr = B > r  ( 0 7 ( + < o .
Here, where the relative violation is greatest, i.e., we have a minimum value of <r£ (r),
the non-compliant quota demand curve is unambiguously less elastic than that of an
da* (t*)
otherwise identical compliant firm. For a compliant firm, a* (r) — 1 and — -T — =  0
dr
everywhere, so that (54) collapses to
=  B f 1 (■) <  0,
dQ* (r) TD/r-i
dr
which, recall, is the slope expression we derived for a compliant firm’s quota demand 
curve in Chapter 2 .
3.4.2 Increasing enforcement
In order to examine the effect of increasing enforcement effort, we employ the as­
sumption that increasing 4>, all else equal, increases the slope of the expected penalty
f . 90'fvi) nfunction, i.e., — — —  >  0 .
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In the relative violation case, the first order conditions (18a) and (18b) can be
written
+  =  Bi (qi) -  9( (vi) ^  =  0
and
£Q = - r  + 6'i (vi) |L = 0.
If we now totally differentiate these conditions with respect to g, Q and <[>, we 
obtain
r rfrl. , r rin* -  ^  1£qqdqj +  LqQdQi — ^  *
and
(55)
■WQqdqi -\r L.QQd(fi
which can be rearranged and written in matrix form as
0 3  t o )  j _
c>$ Q?
t o )  e?
-  d g ?  "
1
0Cr<
1--------- d §
£ Q Q  _ d Q i
L  d §  J
Using Cramer’s Rule we find, firstly,
Lg j A »  +
Vi n
Q f  qQ
Qf
\ H \
< 0 ,
1 q*
which is signed by evaluating —  £qq +  7 + 2  A q  explicitly. Thus, given
vi v i
£ qq =  - 2 ^ K * ) 9* £ ( » ( „ * ) «
<31*3
*2
q F
(56)
(57)
(58)
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and
we can find
A c  + - ± r  
0 ? w  Q IJ 5
0 ? c * 3
o*2
B'lW ) +
Q *2 «5 M ) q 3 + ‘«? K )  ^ 3
■2flj m )  -  «f w )  ± 6 + k )  + «r K )  f a
a*2 a* a*2li i /V /'-.*\ Ft* . /i// / *\
-«5 K )  ^ 4  < 0
From (58) we can see that increasing enforcement unambiguously reduces the catch
dq*
q*. The finding that <  0 everywhere is intuitive, since with expected penalties 
dependent upon relative violations a non-compliant firm always produces where
B[ (<?*) < f, whereas a compliant firm produces where B [  (q*) =  r.
By Cramer’s Rule we can also find
dO'M)
dQ l
d §
J t r  + J L r  '
q * 2  +-<7<7 " F  Q *
\m
A A p . . £ . [Cqq+anr)CQq] 
‘ \& ~ o,
(59)
where, as usual L q q —  C qQ .  We can see straightaway by comparing (59) with
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dQ* der* (v)
(50) that here takes the opposite sign to — \----- . Where the violation rate is
v ' d§ dr
do* (r)
increasing in the quota price (— — -  <  0 ), increasing enforcement increases quota
dr
demand, but where the violation rate is decreasing in the quota price, increasing
enforcement reduces quota demand. Where the violation rate is unchanging in the
quota price, increasing enforcement has no effect upon quota demand, which implies
that here the non-compliant quota demand must equal the compliant quota demand.
1
Recall that this is also where the relative violation rate — 7— is at a maximum.
a\ (r)
Thus, we can state a further result as follows.
Result 3.3 With expected penalties for quota non-compliance dependent upon rel­
ative violations, the quota demand of a non-compliant firm exactly coincides with 
that of an otherwise identical compliant firm at the quota price at which the non- 
compliant firm's relative violation rate is at a maximum.
Figure 3.6 below summarises the implications of Results 3.2 and 3.3. The relative 
violation rate is zero where r — 0 and also where Qf — 0 but is at a maximum at the
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quota price where the quota demand coincides with that of an otherwise identical 
compliant firm.
Fig. 3.6. Non-compliant quota demand curve (relative violations)
Q *
Given erf (<&) =  — we can also find
'  qt
Arf(3>) 1 dQl 01 d £
d‘I> q\ dA> q*2 d3> (60)
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and hence, using (58) and (59),
de* ($ )  
d<S>
d g M
d<S> jqQ
de’A v j)
~*2
H\
g f  r  
L Q f qq
9 1
Q i2
d § .Qi
£ qq + 2^ nQ f qQ
\m
-filn  C „ a  +  C f
+ 1
> 0 , (61)
which is signed by evaluating explicitly the bracketed term on the RHS. Thus,
,*2
L  4- C,,q *2 +2¥ qQ
*2
Qi
Q f
Bi (qi) -  e(v i) ® _  20' (v*)
a  l ) Q f O'! to)
*2Qi
Q f
+ 2—
Qi «i (A*) g jff  +  « ? (Q ) ^
O*2 flft2 <7* <7*2= Bi (qi) -  8"(vi) i j  -  2«; K) _ g> W)
+20 ' « )  ®  +  20" („*) | 1
dof ($ )
Here — — —  has the expected sign everywhere, i.e., increasing enforcement always
reduces the relative violation rate.
It is useful to compare the foregoing with the predicted results we would obtain if 
we assumed that expected penalties depended only upon firms’ level violations. In
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this case we would have
and
39i K ) , f  , c,
M  =  ~ 9 i ~  {Cqq +  , fi93
|Jtf| 1 J
ffli hi),r  , r, 
dQ l 9 $  ! l ! ! +  f g j
|J?| ’ ( j
where
A™ =  3 ' ( « ? ) - * ?  t o )  < 0 ,
£ * ?  =  - * ? ( « < )  < o
and
A *  =  * ? > ? ) >  0.
<90' (v<)
Maintaining the assumption that —^ >  0, we would then have
< #  t - 8? w?)+ o" M )1
1  =  — --------- \H\ =  °  (64)
but
d @ i ( V i  ) I'd// ( n * \  g ' i  ( 7.=<q . n »  ( V i  ) jdh  ( n * \
dQl _  — w ~ [Bi {qi> - ei W  +  e> V i — W ~ Bi {qiK  n
d3> \H\ |£T| 1 '
With a level violation argument in the expected penalty function, increasing en­
forcement (for a given quota price) unambiguously increases firms’ quota demands
but has no effect upon their output (in this case, recall, both compliant and non-
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compliant firms produce where B( (q*) =  r). Here, notice, we can also find
3.5 The industry inverse quota demand
By horizontal aggregation of individual firms5 quota demand curves we obtain the in­
dustry (inverse) quota demand. We then have an immediate corollary to Result 3.1, 
which is that, in an industry in which firms are non-compliant and where expected 
penalties are dependent upon relative violations of quota demands, we would expect 
to observe quota prices lower than in a compliant industry at relatively high TACs, 
but higher quota prices at relatively low TACs. This conclusion differs markedly 
from the case where expected penalties are assumed to depend only upon the level 
violation. Here non-compliance unambiguously leads to lower quota prices.
In the setting of tradeable pollution permits, the possibility of increased individual 
permit demands and higher equilibrium permit prices in a non-compliant industry
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f  \ OyA ( \
was recognised by Malik (1990) in the case where (in my notation) , • —h A '  <
0 , but the possibility that this condition would be met if the subjective probability 
of detection were specified as a function of the relative violation was not considered. 
In Malik (2002) the expected penalty was assumed to depend upon level violations 
from the outset.
3.5 .1 A mix of compliant and non-compliant firms
Although, by assumption, all firms are price-takers in the quota market, given a 
finite number of firms in the fishery it is apparent that non-compliance by even one 
firm will alter the equilibrium quota price if its quota demand changes as a result. 
Malik (1990) makes a similar observation in relation to the increase in the price 
elasticity of demand he finds due to non-compliance in emissions permit markets. 
Since compliant firms always set Q| (r) =  q* (r) =  B f l (r), their quota demands 
and levels of output are clearly sensitive to the behaviour of non-compliant firms.
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Consider the effect on firms’ quota demands if there exists a mix of compliant and 
non-compliant firms in the fishery. If expected penalties for non-compliance are 
based upon level violations (as is generally assumed in the pollution permit litera­
ture, as well as in a fishery setting by Chavez and Salgado, 2005), the equilibrium 
quota price in the fishery will always fall due to the reduced quota demands of non- 
compliant firms. For any given TAC, therefore, the effect of non-compliance by some 
firms is that compliant firms will increase their quota demands in response to the 
lower quota price. If, on the other hand, expected penalties for non-compliance de­
pend upon relative violations, we have seen that the quota demands of non-compliant 
firms can be lower than those of otherwise identical compliant firms, but they can 
also be the same or even higher.
The assumption of expected penalties based upon the level violation size leads us to 
conclude that non-compliance by some firms will always produce a relative shift in 
quota demand from non-compliant firms to compliant firms. If expected penalties 
are a function of relative violations, however, depending on the quota price we may
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observe no effect at all or even the opposite effect: a shift in quota demand from 
compliant firms to the non-compliant firms in the fishery.
3 .6  Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined fishing firms’ demands for quota when non- 
compliant, with a particular focus on the implications of modelling expected penal­
ties for infringement as a function of the firm’s relative, rather than level, violation 
of quotas. Whereas modelling non-compliance based upon level violations predicts 
that a non-compliant firm’s output is always the same as that of an otherwise iden­
tical compliant firm, but its quota demand is lower, including a relative violation 
argument in the expected penalty function predicts that a non-compliant firm’s 
output always exceeds that of an otherwise identical compliant firm, although de­
pending upon the quota price, its quota demand may be lower than, greater than 
or the same as that of a compliant firm. As a consequence, depending upon the 
TAC, with non-compliance the industry equilibrium quota price may be lower than,
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higher than or the same as that in a compliant industry. This contrasts with the 
standard prediction, based upon level violation models, that the equilibrium quota 
price will always be lower with non-compliance.
The relative violation model also predicts that a firm’s relative violation is at a max­
imum at the interior quota price at which the compliant and non-compliant quota 
demands coincide, decreasing towards compliance as the quota price approaches zero 
and also, at higher quota prices, as the quota demand approaches zero. The level vi­
olation model, on the other hand, has violations (both level and relative) increasing 
everywhere in the quota price.
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4. Market power in a compliant ITQ fishery
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we look at the impact of market power in an ITQ fishery, assuming 
now that all firms are quota compliant (the combined effects of market power and 
non-compliance will be investigated in Chapter 5) . 1 We consider firstly market 
power in the quota market and then simultaneous market power in both the quota 
market and the output market.
Here we model market power in terms of a single dominant' firm and a competitive 
fringe, although we will briefly consider quota market oligopoly as well. To begin 
with, we assume that, among the N  fishing vessel firms in the fishery, one (indexed 
1) has market dominance in the quota market, but may or may not have dominance
1 We do, nevertheless, identify where non-compliance is the only possible outcome when firm behaviour 
is unconstrained.
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in the output (catch) market. The other i — 2,3,..., N  vessel firms are price takers in 
the markets for both quota and output. For each competitive firm, short run gross 
profits, i.e., profits before payments for quota, are given as before by Bi (qi) =  pqi — 
Ci (q f  and, in the absence of quotas, are maximised where B[ (q*) =  p — cj (q*) — 0.
Again, in a given period, the fishery manager sets a TAC for the fishery Q and each
N
firm demands an amount of quota Q* at market equilibrium, where Q* =  Cl. All
i= 1
firms are assumed to be quota compliant, so that q* <  Q*,i — 1 , 2 , ...,JV. Firms in 
the competitive fringe (which always set Q* — q*) then maximise short run profits 
with the decision rule B( (q*) =  r, where, as before, r is the short run (rental) price 
of quota.
4.2 Firm 1 has market power only in the quota market
Consider, first, a situation in which the dominant firm can exert market power in 
the quota market, but is a price taker in the output market (this might be the case,
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for example, if other, separately-managed, fisheries produced an identical product 
for the same market). The dominant firm’s short run profit maximisation problem 
is then
max 7Ti =  Bx (qf) -  r (Q, -  Q f  [Qx -  Q f
gi.Qi
s.t. qi >  0 , Qi >  0 , Qx >  qlt (67)
where Qi >  0 is the initial allocation of quota to the dominant firm. Note that the
quota price is determined by the residual quota supply to the competitive fringe
(in which all firms set B\ (qf) — r) and hence r =  r (Y/^=2 Q») =  r (Q — Q f. with
dr (f
r' (.) <  0 , or, equivalently, “ >  0 .
oQ i
The corresponding Lagrangian is
C =  B, (q,) -  r (X I -  Q ,) [Qi -  0 J  -  A, [9l -  QJ (6 8 )
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are
A  =  B'l il)-  a; <  0 , g f > 0 , A<£ =  °. (69a)
A 3 =  - r ( n - Q i ) + r ' ( n - Q i ) [ g i - g 1] +  a ; < o ,  q ; > o ,  l qq i  =  o,
(69b)
a  =  - ^ + o ; > o, a; > o, A\a;  =  o. (69c)
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=  R, (Qi) >  0,
where Rx (Ql) =  r (Cl -  QQ -  r' (Q -  Qi) [Qi -  QL].
For QI — ql >  0, we then have, solving for AJ,
(70)
Here, Ri (Ql) is the dominant firm’s marginal revenue from selling quota if Qi >  Q\ 
or its marginal cost of buying quota if Qi <  Ql- Given r (.) >  0  and r' (.) < 0 , we 
can see that in the case where <  Qi, i.e., the dominant firm is behaving as a 
monopolist, we have Ri (Ql) <  r (.), i.e., at the optimum the marginal revenue from 
selling quota to the competitive fringe is less than the (equilibrium) quota price, 
whereas in the case where Ql >  Q1} i.e., the firm is behaving as a monopsonist, 
we have Ri (Q^) >  r („), i.e., the marginal cost of buying quota from the fringe is 
greater than the quota price. As Malik (2002) notes for a similar model of emissions 
permit demand, both are increasing in Qi if the second order sufficient condition 
for Ql to be a profit maximising choice of Q\ is satisfied. Thus, given
Cqq =  2  r'(.) -  r" (.) [QI -  <  0, (71) 
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then
dRi (Qi) =  - C qq >  0 . (72)
dQi
From (72) it is apparent that the dominant firm faces increasing marginal costs of 
buying quota from the fringe and decreasing marginal revenues from selling quota 
to the fringe.
The relationship between the dominant firm’s marginal benefit and the quota price, 
defined by expression (70), depends upon the initial allocation Qi in relation to the 
quota demand Q\. We have
Qi > Qi ^  B[ (qi) > r («), (73a)
Qi ~  Qi B 1 (qi) — r (.), (73b)
QI < Qi =* B [(q l)< r ( .) , (73c)
with, in the limit,
B[ (ql) =  R, (QI) =  0, (74)
since, clearly, the firm will not operate where B[ (qi) , R1 (Q^) <  0.
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Fig. 4.1. Dominant firm with monopsony power
Figure 4.1 illustrates the dominant firm’s choice of Ql =  g* when its initial quota 
allocation is zero. Here R\ (Qi) is the firm’s marginal cost of buying quota from 
the competitive fringe, whose inverse quota demand is shown as r (Q — Qf). In 
Figure 4.2 the dominant firm is initially allocated the entire TAC and R\ [Qi] is its 
marginal revenue from selling quota to the fringe.
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Fig. 4.2. Dominant firm with monopoly power
Only in case (73b) above is the equilibrium quota price the competitive (efficient) 
quota price, where the marginal costs of production are equated across all firms. In 
case (73a) the quota price faced by the competitive fringe is too low, so that the 
competitive firms over-produce relative to the dominant firm, while in case (73c) 
the quota price faced by the competitive fringe is too high, so that the competitive 
firms under-produce relative to the dominant firm.
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For the dominant firm to hold excess quota, i.e., where Ql >  ql >  0, from the 
complementary slackness condition =  0  we must have =  0 , so that
B ( (ql) =  0 (75)
and
Rx (QJ) =  r ( . ) -  r' ( . ) [ ( ? ! -  Qx] =  0, (76)
which, given r >  0  and r' (.) <  0 , requires Q\ <  Qi (monopoly power). Thus the 
dominant firm will only hold excess quota if it is initially over-endowed with quota 
(relative to its free optimal level of production) to a sufficient extent that its marginal 
revenue from selling quota is zero when B [ (ql) is zero (given that Q l >  q l).2
This is the result found by Malik (2002) for a dominant firm in an emissions permit 
market.3 As Malik (2002) notes, the dominant firm will not otherwise hold excess 
quota, for example by “over-buying” quota from the competitive fringe. If the
2 Note that, even if the TAC were to exceed the to ta l unconstrained industry output, if the  initial allocation 
of quota to the dominant firm were high enough it could restrict the supply of quota to the competitive 
fringe and hence restrict its level of output,
3 Malik (2002), however, characterises the necessary condition for withdrawing quota as (in my notation)
B[ (qi) — Mi (Qi) <  0 where Q\ =  qi, which is clearly not an optimal solution for the firm.
dominant firm is not sufficiently over-endowed, it will always set Q\ =  qf (like firms 
in the competitive fringe) and its initial quota endowment will determine whether it 
under- or over-produces relative to a competitive firm, so that its marginal cost of 
production is respectively higher or lower than the other firms in the fishery (which 
produce where B[ (qf) — r). Note that a dominant firm entering the quota market 
or participating in a quota auction (i.e., where Q\ — 0) will always under-produce 
for the observed equilibrium quota price and will never hold excess quota.
In Figure 4.3 the dominant firm’s unconstrained output is relatively smaller com­
pared to the TAC. Initially allocated the entire TAC, the firm’s marginal revenue 
from selling quota Ri (Qf) is zero while its quota holdings still exceed q\
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Fig. 4.3. Dominant firm demands excess quota
4.2 .1 Comparative statics
The key parameter of interest here is the dominant firm’s initial quota allocation
Qi. Following van Egteren and Weber (1996), from r =  r (Cl — QJ) we can find
dr (.) dQ\ . dr (.) . , . dQi
— =— =  —r (.) , so that the sign of -  is the same as that of —R . If we
dQi dQi dQi dQi
then totally differentiate (70) we get
Cqqdq\ +  CQQdQl =  r' (.) dQu (77)
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which, if qf — Q f  can be rearranged to give
dQ\ dq{ r' („)
>  0, (78)dQi dQi Cqq ~f- C q q  
which is signed from r' („) < 0 and the second order sufficient condition C qq +
C q q  <  0.4 Hence, increasing the firm’s initial endowment also increases its final
quota demand (and increases the equilibrium quota price). Notice, however, that if
Qi >  >  0 then from (76) we can still find
dQl r' ( . )
dQ 1 CQ Q
> 0 , (79)
dqi
but, provided B( (qf =  0 continues to hold, we must have —+  =  0. More formally,
dQi
from total differentiation of the first order conditions for the unconstrained problem
we obtain
dqi
Cqq £qQ dQi 0
d-'Qq £qq . dQl rf (.)
dQi _
and hence, by Cramer’s Rule,
dq{  _  - C qQr' (.) 
dQi |H|
=  0 , (80)
4 For the constrained problem, the second order sufficient condition is |iij =  — [Cqq +  C q q  +  2£ 9q ]  >  0, 
but here CqQ =  0.
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dQl Cqqr' (.) r' (.)
given CqQ — 0, together with
>  0. (81)
dQi + 1  A
At the margin, therefore, altering the initial allocation Qi to a dominant firm that 
finds it profitable to withhold quota from the market will not change its optimal 
level of output. Here, the firm’s choices of Q\ and ql become quite independent.
Note that, by the Envelope Theorem, the effect on firm profits is simply given by
dirl d£ 
dQ \ dQ i
=  r («) >  0, which we can affirm as follows. Fully differentiating through
the Lagrangian by Qi we have
dqi dQ\
(82)
Substituting the first order conditions for >  0 into (82) we obtain
dir
dQi
i = r ( . )  +  A J
dqi dQl
dQi dQi
- a :
dqi dQl
f iQ i d Q i"
and hence
dir i
d Q i = r { -) '
(83)
since we know that either ql =  Ql or A{ =  0.
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Finally, let
N
n  (Q i)  — Bi H- (<?*;Qi) (84)
i=2
denote total industry (economic) profits as a function of the initial allocation to 
the dominant firm Qi. Note that here we have ignored all quota payments, which 
merely represent transfers between firms. We can find the effect on industry profits 
of a marginal change in Qi as
^  - «<->g+£*<■>!s
-  <»>
rln*
since, in the fringe, all firms set B[ (.) =  r (,). If qi — Q\, then necessarily
dQi
-R -  and therefore— — •ciuu bue ru
■ ' = [ ^ ( . ) - r ( . ) ] # S O ,  (86)
dQi dQx _^2 dQl
dU (Qi) _  rp/ M / \i
— - [£ i  W - r ( -)1d 5 7 <  
so that industry profits are maximised where B[ (.) =  r (.), which requires Q\ =  Qi.
If, on the other hand, we have q{ <  Q\, then B[ (,) — 0 and hence
d l l  ( Q i )  dQi . .
- E r = - r W l f < a  <87>
Thus, where the dominant firm is withholding quota from the market, (further) 
increasing its initial allocation unambiguously reduces industry profits.
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4.3 Firm 1 has market power in both quota and output 
markets
Now consider a (compliant) firm with both quota and output market dominance. 
This might arise in a situation where the entire market is supplied by one fishery 
under ITQ management. The firm’s profit maximisation problem is now
max tti =  £ i ( g i , p ( q ) ) - r ( Q - g 1}p(q)) [ Q i - Q i ]  (8 8 )
9i,vi *
s.t. q1 >  0 , Qx >  0 , Qx >  qi, 
where q =qx +  Qf denotes the total industry output, i.e., the combined output of
N
the dominant firm and that of the competitive fringe qp =  qi, and p (q) is the
i=2
inverse consumer demand for the industry output, with, as is usual, p' (q) <  0 . 
Note that any changes in p (q) will impact upon both the dominant firm’s own gross 
profit B i (■) and, indirectly through the effect on marginal gross profits B( (qf) in 
the competitive fringe, the equilibrium quota price r (=) (we continue to assume a 
compliant fringe, so that qp =  Qf — Q — Qi)-
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The corresponding Lagrangian and Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
L =  B 1 (qltp (q)) -  r (tt -  Qu p (q)) [Qi -  Qi] ~  Ai [qi -  Q i], (89)
with
<9£i(.) , dB1(t) dq dr(<) , dq_ r ^
A  =  T  +  W p (q) %  -  (q) ® [Ql “  0 l] “ Al -  ° ’
>  0, A,<4 =  0, (90a)
- < ■ > - ? £  t « - 0 ,1 - £ & /  ( , )  £  [ « - « , ] ♦ . .
Qi >  0, CqQI =  0, (90b)
A  =  - 9i + Q * i > o ,  a ; > o ,  a a ;  =  o. (90c)
For Ql — (/i >  0, we then have
^ r + p ' ( q ) ^ t e - [ Q ; - Q i ] ] = 4 > °  (91)
and
HO +  [Qi -  Qi] -  p' (q) ^  [«I -  [QI -  Qi] ] =  a; >  0 , (92)
where we have used =  and 7r H  =  J-5
dp (-) (q)
Since r (.) =  B'i (qi) =  p (q) — c( (tp) in the competitive fringe, we have 0r (.) /dp  (q) =  1.
95
Solving (91) and (92) for AJ, we obtain the joint decision rule
dBx (.) 
dqi
+  p'( q) d q  d q
dqx dQ i
where, as before,
R, (Q{) =  r (.) +  [01 -  f t ]  ,
noting that — 1 is here equivalent to B( (qf and X. is equivalent to — r' («) 
dqi oQi
in the previous section. The additional term on the LHS of (93) captures the firm’s
net marginal impact upon its own gross profits Bi („) as well as on r (.) (and hence
on Ri (Q f)  through the effect of its own output and quota demand upon the total
industry output q and hence the market price p (q). We can see, however, that if
Qi =  QX then (93) becomes simply
dBi (■) 
dqi +p'(q)
dq +  dq
dqi dQi_
Qi =  Ri (Q f  , (94)
so that the net impact of output market power depends only upon the firm’s initial
quota endowment Qi.
In order to examine the dominant firm’s impact upon total output, we can firstly
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write
dq =  dqi dqF =  dqF
dqi dqi dqx dqi ’
where dqF f dqi is the firm’s conjectural derivative for the output of the competitive 
fringe in relation to its own output.
With a compliant fringe under ITQs, we know that, all else equal, dqF/dp (q) — 0, 
i.e., the output supply of the fringe is constrained by its residual quota supply, i.e., 
qp — Qf =  Cl — Qid Hence, dqp/dqi — 0 (Cournot) and therefore dq/dqi — 1 . 
Similarly, we can write
dq dqi dqp_ =  Q dqF
dQi dQi dQi dQi'
Here, given market clearing in the quota market, a compliant fringe implies dqp/dQi
dQp/dQi =  —1 , so that dq/dQi =  —1 .
This assumes, of course, th a t the fringe quota supply [fi — Qi] remains binding.
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q q O F )
With —— =  +1 and -7—— =  — 1, we have —-----(- ——— =  0, so that (93) collapses to
dqi dQ 1 dqi dQi
=  (Q j) , (95)
as in the case of a firm with dominance only in the quota market. Although (given 
a compliant fringe) QI — Qi implies that the firm has no net effect upon total 
industry output (which always remains at the level of the TAC), only where qf =  
[ q ; - f t ]  >  0  are the first order conditions equivalent to those for a firm with 
dominance only in the quota market. In that case, however, note that we cannot 
have dBi (.) /dqi — Ri {Q f — 0 , since Ri (Q f =  0  requires [QI — Q f  <  0 .
For the dominant firm to hold excess quota (QI >  gj), we require Al =  0 in the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions and hence from (91) and (92) we will have
^ + + p '(q )? [= p '(q ) [ f t -f t ]  §0 (96)
and
r  (0 +
dr (,)
. dQi p'(q) [ f t - f t ]  = - p ' ( q ) 9 l > 0 , (97)
where we have rearranged terms in order to distinguish the marginal impacts on
revenues from the catch and on revenues from (costs of) quota sales (purchases).
Whereas, from (97), marginal quota costs/revenues are always positive, from (96) 
the net marginal benefit from the catch may be negative where it is profitable to 
purchase quota. In the case where Ql — Q 1} notice, the dominant firm produces 
where
^ § R + P , ( q ) <tf =  o, 
which is simply the usual rule for a monopoly producer. At the same time, we 
have r (.) =  —p1 (q) ql and hence dBi («) /dqi =  r («), so that total output, although 
it may be less than the TAC, is efficiently produced. Here, the dominant firm’s 
initial allocation is such that it does not exercise market power in the quota market, 
although it does in the output market.
Combining (96) and (97) we can observe that
=  Rx (Ql) =  p'(q) [ [q; -  Ql] -  <?;] >  0. (98) 
Here, we must again have dBi (.) /dqi =  Ri(Ql) >  0 , since, given r (.) >  0 , 
Ri (Qi) <  0 implies [Q  ^— Q j  <  0 and hence p' (q) [[QJ — QJ — q£] >  0 . Given 
p' (q) <  0, in (98) we therefore require [[Ql — Qi] — ql] < 0  and hence [Q* -  Q j  <
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ql. This immediately excludes the possibility that a dominant firm will withdraw 
quota from the market when its initial allocation Qi is zero, but otherwise >  qf 
does not now require Qi >  Q\. We can therefore state the following result.
Result 4.1 If a compliant firm has market dominance in both the quota market and 
the output market, it may hold excess quota in order to support the market price for 
its output, even if it is a net purchaser of quota, provided that the firm’s initial quota 
endowment is strictly positive, so that its net demand for quota is smaller than its 
total output.
Given market power in the output market as well as in the quota market, a dominant 
firm may purchase quota in order to withhold it from the market, provided that Qi 
is strictly positive. Notice that Q\ — ql is also feasible as an unconstrained solution 
to (8 8 ) given the same condition, but not otherwise. In either case, Qi >  0 ensures 
that, if the dominant firm is a net purchaser of quota, the amount of quota purchased 
is strictly less than its output. Rearranging the RHS of (98), we can also observe
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that, if the firm is holding excess quota, we will always have
[CI -  stf] <  C i ,
i.e., the amount of excess quota held (if any) is strictly less than the firm’s initial 
allocation (this could provide a general “rule of thumb” for the avoidance of output 
restriction under ITQs).
The result implied by (98) contrasts with the finding of Anderson (1991) that, 
if the dominant firm were a net purchaser of quota, it would never be profitable 
for it to restrict its output “because any increase in the price of the marketable 
output will be transferred into an increase in the purchase price of ITQs” (p.296). 
Anderson’s (1991) conclusion appears to derive from his assumption that, in the 
quota monopsony case, Qi =  0 , so that, as we have seen, the firm will indeed 
not hold excess quota. In a very recent paper, Anderson (2008) revises this earlier
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conclusion, although without a full formal analysis of the problem.7 But, notice, 
the dominant firm will not freely even match its quota holdings to its output if the 
initial quota allocation is zero, which implies that, in this case, the firm will cheat.
If we relax the assumption of compliance, we can see that while Qf <  ql is the 
only possible unconstrained solution to (8 8 ) if Q± =  0 , it is also an unconstrained 
solution if Qi >  0 . Note that if, in (96), Qi — 0 , then we would have
^ f + + p ' ( q ) < £ = p ' ( q ) f t  < o  (99)
and
r(.) +  M + ; = p ' ( q ) [ f t - t f ] > 0 . (1 0 0 )
Here, we cannot rule out Q\ >  0 even where r (,) >  0 , i.e., the firm may purchase 
quota even if it is not subject to any enforcement. If the firm is non-compliant, 
however, we assume that it expects to incur a penalty for a violation (see Chapter
7 The setting of Anderson’s (2008) paper is rather different to mine. He distinguishes between “traditional” 
or “capacity-based” m arket power and “perm it-based” market power, which he treats separately. The 
prim ary focus of his analysis is then the possibility th a t one quota-holding firm might find it profitable to 
lease the productive capacity of other firms in order to control the market supply of fish.
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5).
In summary, if the initial endowment of quota to the dominant firm is greater than 
zero, the firm may choose to withhold quota from the market or to cheat, or indeed 
to match quota and output. The results in general appear to be ambiguous and 
hence parameter-specific, depending upon the relative production capacities of the 
dominant firm and the competitive fringe as well as the relative slopes of the con­
sumer inverse demand curve for the industry output and the (fringe) inverse quota 
demand curve. If, on the other hand, the dominant firm’s initial quota allocation 
is zero, it will unambiguously be non-compliant, although even in the absence of 
enforcement the firm’s quota demand may then be non-zero.
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Fig. 4.4a. The dominant firm chooses Q\ — Qi >  q{.
Figures 4.4a-4.4d illustrate possible unconstrained outcomes when Q\ — QI, i.e.,
when the dominant firm is not exercising market power in the quota market. Here,
M B  (qi) denotes 9 9 il. (solid line) and 9 9 E  (q) qx (broken line). From (96) 
oqi oqi
and (97), Qi =  Qi >  0 implies that
EE = ~v' ^ 9 i*
Whether we have Qi ~  g* is parameter-specific, but in each case, notice, production 
is efficiently allocated. In Figure 4.4a we have an equilibrium where QI >  qi, in
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Figure 4.4b, Q| =  q\ while in Figures 4.4c and 4.4d, Q\ <  q{- Only in Figure 4.4d 
do we have a situation in which — 0 .
Fig. 4.4b. The dominant firm chooses Ql =  Qi =  qf
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Fig. 4.4c. The dominant firm chooses Q \  =  Q i  <  q\.
Fig. 4.4d. The dominant firm chooses Q \  —  Q i  — 0 .
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dB  (•)
Finally, recall that, as before, Qi =  Qi implies —- —— =  r, but this does not now
dqi
require Qi =  ql- Thus, the divergence between the dominant firm’s marginal benefit 
dB  (.)
in output —— and the equilibrium quota price could be reduced when monopoly 
power is exercised in the output market as well as in the quota market. Recall that,
in the absence of market power in the output market, from (75) and (76) we had 
dB , (.)
dqi
=  0  and therefore
f \ dB\ (•) / \ dr (.) i n
dq, =  ( ' ) =  dQi  ^ ~  '
where Q± >  Qi. With market power exercised in the output market as well, from 
(93) we now have
Hence, with the exercise of market power in the output market as well as in the 
quota market we have the possibility that production could be efficiently allocated 
between the dominant firm and the competitive fringe (in the case where Q{ — Qp), 
which is not possible where market power is exercised in the quota market alone. 
In effect, the exercise of output market power can act to correct inefficiency in the 
quota market.
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4 .3.1 Comparative statics
We look firstly at the comparative statics with respect to changes in the firm’s initial
quota allocation Qi.
The second order sufficient conditions for (89) are now rather complex. They are
r  = d2Bx (.) +  2p'(q)|3- +-m dg2 ■ v-./ dqi p" (q)
<9q
dqi + p '(q) Q,2
d \
dqf |>1* -  [Q*1 -  Ql]] < 0
and
(101)
c =  -  qdr C  -  d2r C  \n> _  n  1 -  
Q Q  d Q i  d Q l  ‘  d Q i
P" (q)
dq
dQ i -fp'(q)
d2 q
dQl
dq . , <92q dq
[q l -  [Ql -  Qi]] < o .  (1 0 2 )
<92q
Where —— =  +1 (with —~j =  0) and ——  -- — 1 (with — k — 0), however,
dqi dq dQi dQl
conditions (1 0 1 ) and (1 0 2 ) simplify considerably to
£ qq
d2B1 (■) 
dqi
+  2p ' ( q ) + / ( q) [ q l - l Q l - Q ,] ]  <Q (103)
and
£ o o  =  —2
dr (.) d2r (.) 
~ d Q l~ ~ d Q f [Ql ~ Qi] + p' (q) + p" (q) [ql ~ [Qi -  Qi] ] < 0. (104)
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We also have
CqQ C-Qq P (q)
dq dq
.dQl dgi_ + dQi dgi dgidQi_
which, again given 7—  =  + 1  and 7— 7 -  =  — 1, simplifies to 
dgi dQi
(105)
CqQ =  C Qq =  - 2  p'(q) -  p" (q) (q’l -  (Q\ — Qx]] §  0 ,(106)
together with
£\q =  — 1, C\Q =  +1. (107)
For the constrained problem (QI =  q f  we can then find
,, dAj ( dq 1 dQi _
Cxxw P  XqW i XQw r  '
(108)
and
 ^ dAi t r dqi y r dQi _  dq , f^
dQi +  qqdQ! +  qQ dQi ~  P (q) dqi ~  P (q)
(109)
dX 1 dqi dQi_  dr(.) • 9q   9r(.)
q± Q i  5Qd ft  QQrfQi dQi dQi ^   ^ ^
from total differentiation of the first order conditions, which can be written in matrix
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form as
CxX C\q C\Q 
CqX Cqq CqQ 
CQX C(Qq C qq
By Cramer’s Rule, we can then find
■ d v
dQi
dqi
dQi
dQi
,dQi_
-p ' (q)
dr (.)
a c T + p ( q )
0
Cxx 0 C xq
CqX -p ' (q) CqQ
dqi C qx
dr  ( . )
“ E  + p ( q ) C qq
dQi \n\
>  0 (111)
where
Cxx
Cqx
C qx
0 Cxq
-p ' (q) CqQ
dr (»)
'~ d o T + p  (q)
+ C xq
d r j )
dQi
jqX
>  0
dr (.)
dQi + p  (q) -  Cqx l~p' (q)]
and the determinant of the bordered Hessian H  is
Cxx C\q C\Q 
C qX Cqq C qQ 
C qx C Qq C qq
— — [Cqq +  C qq  +  2 CqQ] >  0 .
We can also find
dQj
dQi
Cxx Cxq
Cq\ Cqq
C qx CQq
0
-p ' (q)
dr (.)
H
>  0 (112)
where
Cxq
Cqq
C qx CQq
Cxx
C q X
0
-p ’ (q) 
dr (.) , . .
a o T + p ( q )
~C xq
dr (.) 
dQi
'qX
>  0.
dr (■) 
dQi + p' (q) -  CQX -P' (q)]
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dq* dQ*
Hence, as before, when QI =  q\ we have —-A  =  —=A > 0.
dQi dQx
We now derive comparative statics with respect to Q\ for the unconstrained problem. 
Prom total differentiation of the first order conditions Cq and Cq we obtain the 
equations
Cqq CqQ
£ qQ C qq
dq\ r
dQi
dQl
_ dQi _ L
i f  \ dq  
(q) %  
d r { ,)  P'q ) ^
i • • dq _ _ dq
or, again substituting —— — + 1  and -
dqi dQi
dQi
-1,
dQi
Cqq CqQ
CqQ ^QQ
[ dqi 1 P
dQi
dQl
.  dQx _
-p' (q)
dr (,)
9 f t + p ( q )
We can then find
dqj
dQi
-P' (q) Cqq
dr („)
dQi ffp'(q) 'qQ
\ H \
and
dQl
dQi
dr (.)
dQi + p' (q) Cqq +  p (q) CqQ >
< 0,
where
(113)
(114)
\H\ — CqqCQQ — C2qQ > 0.
In general, both (113) and (114) are difficult to sign. However, if we assume linearity
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d2r (.)
in p (q) and r (.), so that p" (q) =  0 and ■ to y  =  ^ en we have
dQ\
dqj
dQi
-p '  (q)
ndrL) . . x
r t o +p(q)]
_ _
<9r(.) *
r  d q !  (q)] [ - V  (q)]
\H
t W
Iffl
> 0 , (115)
together with
dQl
dQi
dr (■) 
dQi
+  p'( q)
(.) n t/ ' 
 r 1 +  V  (q)dqi + p'(q)[-2p/ (q)]
dr (.) 
0Q i
(.)
+  V  (q)
#/ ^d2B 1 (.)
+ p ( q ) T > 0 . (116)
At least in the linear example, therefore, both output and quota demand are again
increasing in the initial quota endowment Qi, although here, in general, —J- 7  ^ -= -k
«Q i  dQi
As before, let
n (q 1) = b 1(.) +  J 2 b<(-) (H7)
i—2
denote total industry (economic) profits as a function of the initial allocation to the 
dominant firm Qi. We can then find the effect on industry profit of a marginal
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change in Q i as
dq dq
or. since here we have —— =  + 1  and 7-7— =  — 1 , while we know that firms in the
dqi dQ 1
fringe set B[ (.) =  r (.),
1 1 181
where q*F denotes the output of the competitive fringe.
If Qi =  qi, then given Q*F =  q*F we have and
dQ 1 dQi dQx dQi
therefore (118) can be collapsed to
T ^ - H i U - r W l g .  (119)
as in the case of a dominant firm without power in the output market, so that
industry profits are maximised where B [ (.) =  r (.), which requires Q\ — Q\.
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dq* dQ*
If we have QI #  q f  then in general ■—=i- #  — Hence, instead of (119) we have
dQi dQi
dqi dQl
_ dQ i dQ i _
(120)
dn (Qi)
We can see here that for — -+ —4 =  0 we do not now require (.) — r (=). If
dQi
we had (■) =  r (») (which would necessitate QI =  Qi), the dominant firm would 
set B[ (.) =  r (.) =  —p' (q) qf rather than B[ (.) =  r (.) =  —p' (q) q as would be 
required here. Setting (120) equal to zero yields
[B[ (.) +  p' (q) q] ^  =  [r (.) +  p' (q) q] 
dq* dQ*
where it is clear that unless we have —f -  =  -rpf , industry profits are maximised
dQi dQi
where B[ (») #  r (»). Note that, in general, the sign of (120) is ambiguous, depending 
inter alia upon the slope of the consumer (inverse) demand curve p' (q).
4.4 A note on oligopoly
It is of course possible that more than one firm may have market dominance in the 
quota market or in both quota and output markets. We therefore look briefly at the 
implications of oligopoly.
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4 .4.1 Oligopoly on the quota market only
Let the number and size of firms in the fishery be such that all firms are “Cournot 
players” in the quota market, in the sense that each firm’s demand for quota has an 
impact upon the quota price. To begin with, all firms are assumed to be price takers 
in the output market. We assume that the quota market is sufficiently transparent 
that all trades take place at a single price; each firm can observe, perfectly, all 
exchanges, so that arbitrage ensures a single market. Thus, for the ith firm in an 
industry of N  firms we have an inverse (residual) quota supply function
n  (.) = n  (ft -  Qi) =  n (J2&* Qj) >
where at equilibrium we assume that
Vi (ft -  Q i )  =  rj  (ft -  Q j )  =  r (.), Vi 7  ^j ,
while, in general,
r'i (ft -  Q i )  ^  r'j (ft -  Q j ) , Vi ^  j ,  
since, for a given total quota supply ft, the slope of (.) depends upon the quota 
demand curves of the other N  — 1 firms in the industry. Note that, when the quota
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market clears,
dn  (fi -  Qj)
SQ; i w  4 W d(?« ’
so that
d T ,V Q j _ y . d Q j 
dQi f r i  dQi3T6*
i.e., firm Vs “conjectural derivative” for the aggregate quota demand of the other
N  — 1 firms in the industry is —1, just as it is in the case of a single dominant
firm faced by a competitive fringe. In each case the value of —1 (normally the
“competitive” conjecture) is imposed by the fixed total supply of quota Cl and the
assumption of market clearing.
The optimal decision rule for the ith “Cournot” firm is, following (70),
B'i (?*) =  r (fi -  Qt) -  r' (.) [Q? -  Qt] , (1 2 1 )
where the relationship between B\ (qf) and r (■) depends on whether the firm is a 
net seller or purchaser of quota, as in the case of the single dominant firm. Since, 
at equilibrium, all firms face the same quota price r (.), for any two firms i and j  we
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B'i (?,*) -  B )  (g*) =  r 'j (.) [ft* -  f t ]  -  rj (.) [ft* -  f t ]  |  0, Vi, j.  (122)
If the firms are either both net sellers or both net purchasers of quota, the sign 
of (122) is ambiguous. It is possible that, between some firms at least, the allo­
cation of production is efficient, i.e., B( (qf) — Bf (qf), even though, in general, 
B[ (qf), Bf (qf) #  r (.). But if firm i is a net seller of quota (Qf <  Qf) and firm j  is 
a net purchaser of quota (Qf >  Qj), as would necessarily be the case in a duopoly 
setting, we must have
that is, firm i overproduces for the observed quota price, while firm j  underproduces. 
In this case it is possible, nevertheless, for the equilibrium quota price to be the same 
as that which would be established if we had B\ (qf) =  Bf(qf) — r (.) (which would 
require both Qf — Qi and Qf =  Qf). In a quota market oligopoly, therefore, the 
equilibrium quota price provides little information about the (allocative) efficiency 
of production in the industry.
can solve for r (.) and write
117
In the simple duopoly case, let
n ( Q i )  =  B{ (qt; Q») +  B} (qf Q i )  (123)
denote total industry (economic) profit as a function of the initial quota allocation 
to firm i. Then we can find the effect on industry profit of a marginal change in Qi
as
dn (Qi) __ Tjf / \ fto j_ r ' M iM. oa\
dQi 1 dQi j dQi' ( }
If both q* — Ql and q* =  QJ, then necessarily and
3 3 dQi dQi dQi dQi
hence
=  (125)
so that, as we would expect, industry profits are maximised where B[ (.) — B) (.)
(requiring Q i  =  Q| and Q j  — QJ). If, however, we have gf <  Q| (in which case we
dq*
must have gj =  QJ), then -jfi- — 0 and hence
dQi
dU(Qi) dqi
- S T -*><•> < 0 ' <m »
dQ| dQJ dq*
since >  0 implies <  0 and therefore - = -  <  0 . Again, where one firm is
d(gi cl(gi dCgi
withholding quota from the market, (further) increasing its initial allocation unam­
biguously reduces industry profits.
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Notice that, in the quota market, we cannot have “consistent conjectures” . If we 
take the first order condition for Q*
CQ =  - r  (fi -  Qi) +  r< (fi -  Qi) [Q* -  Qt] +  A* =  0,
then, in the duopoly case, by the Implicit Function Theorem we can find
£ QQdQ* +  [ - / : QQ}dQ* =  0, i ^ j ,  (127)
given that market clearing implies Q\ — Cl — Q f  and hence the slope of firm Vs 
“best response function” as
dQ* _ C qq  _  - n o o x
OQj F qq
and not —1. This is intuitive, however, since, given the market clearing condition,
dr (.) dr (.)
>  0 implies < 0, so that, all else equal, we would expect firm Vs quota
dQi dQj
demand to increase with an increase in quota demand by firm j. For a given Cl,
dQ*
though, we must in fact have —— =  — 1 .
j
4.4.2 Oligopoly in both quota and output markets
Now consider Cournot players in the output market as well as in the quota market.
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Following (91) and (92), for the ith firm we have
dBi (•) , v’ (a) L  _  M l  r0 .  _  0 .1 ' 
d qi + P ( q ) dqi 9i 9 p ( q ) LQi Q ' (
A* >  0 (129)
and
_  M )l-Q. _  1
4  dp(q) y,J =  A* >  0, (130)
and hence
0 B j ( . )
dqi
+  p'( q)
dq dq
dqi +  dQi_
(131)
dr (.)
Note, however, that here we have retained the term —- f l  from the Kuhn-Tucker
dp (q)
conditions (90a) and (90b), since, in general, we cannot assume, as we did in the
d B (  o) dr (.)
case of a competitive fringe, that — — r («) and hence that ——7+  =  1 .
dqj dp{ q)
In the duopoly case, q =  qi +  qj. Here, we have
dq dqj
dq{ dqi'
If firm j  sets Qj — qj, then =  0 and hence — 0 and —— =  1 , but if firm j
dp (q) dqi dqi
r\ q
is holding excess quota (or cheating) then we may have — /  . #  0 , so that #  0  
- - dp (q) dq{
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<9q
and hence 7-— 7  ^ 1. In 
dqi
dq _  dq3 dqj dQ3
dQi dQi dQj dQi ’
dQ
market clearing still implies - f -  — —1 , so that, as before,
uAoli
dq =  dq3 dq3
dQi dQi dQ3'
$
If firm j  sets Q3 — q3, then ——  =  1 and hence ~  =  — 1, but if firm j  is
dQj dQi dQi
dqj , 1   dqholding excess quota or cheating then we may have ~ ~  -=fi 1 and hence —— 7  ^ — 1 .
(sCjj (sQi
Thus if for firm j , Qj 7  ^ qj, even the sign of dq dq
dqi dQi
is ambiguous, in which
case we can only observe that for firm i we have
^ I r  §  r » + ? a  [ « - « * ]  (132)
and hence — 1  ^  ^ ^  r (.), even where Ql — Qi. The corollary, however, is that we 
OQi
may have an efficient quota allocation even where Q *  Q i  and QJ 7  ^ Q j .
As before, we can find the effect on total industry profit of a marginal change in Qi
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as
(Q{) =  dBj(.) dRjQ)
dQi dQi OQi
...... d/m  dqi . r>t / \ dQj
i W c/Oi h ' ) dQ.
dq dqf , dq dQf
+ p ( q ) ^ ' ^ q + p ( q ) 9 0 : ' r f Q - q- (133)
If both qi =  QI and q* =  Qi, then we know that ±  =  f i r  =  — r f  — — I f  and
dQi dQi dQi
<9q 5q
that —- — —7777- and hence (133) collapses to 
dq{ dQi
g ,  (134)
dQ*
so that, whatever the value of —R-, industry profits are maximised where B'{ (.) =
dCgi
Bj (■) (which still requires Qf =  Qi and Q* — Qf).
dq* dQ*
If, however, we have qf f  Qf, then, as we have seen, in general R —R , so that
dCgi
=  [Bi (.) +  jf (q) q] g j -  -  [BJ (.) +  Jf (q) q] g  §  0. (135)
dq* dQ*
If we have qf R Q* and qf R Q f  then again, in general — R —=A while, also in
dq <9q
general, 7— R + 1  and 7-7 -  A — 1 and therefore 
uQi 9Qi
dU
dQi
„ / / u  / n 9 q  1 dqf Bi(.)+ P (q )^ q  ^ £ + ) - p '( q ) | | q dQj > dQ- <§  0. (136)
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From (135) and (136), it is apparent that if one or both of the firms are withholding 
quota from the market or cheating then industry profits are not, in general, max­
imised where Bf (.) =  Bf (.) and (hence) Qf —  Q i  and Qf =  Q j .  In general, the 
signs of (135) and (136) are also ambiguous.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have looked at the profit maximising behaviour of a dominant 
fishing firm faced by a competitive fringe, in this case assuming that all firms are 
quota compliant.
We firstly examined market dominance in the quota market only. The basic results 
follow those derived by Malik (2002) for the analogous case in a pollution permit 
market. Where the dominant firm demands only sufficient quota for its own pro­
duction, it maximises profits by setting the marginal benefit of production equal to 
the (decreasing) marginal revenue from selling quota to the competitive fringe (if
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its initial quota allocation is such that it is a net seller of quota) or equal to the 
(increasing) marginal cost of purchasing quota from the fringe (in the case where its 
initial quota allocation is small enough that it is a net purchaser of quota). Only 
where the firm’s final quota demand is the same as its initial quota allocation do we 
have the firm’s marginal benefit of output equated with the quota price (following 
Hahn 1984). Otherwise, industry output is not efficiently allocated: the dominant 
firm’s output (and hence quota demand) is too high where it exercises monopoly 
power in the quota market and too low where it behaves as a monopsonist.
If the initial allocation of quota to the dominant firm is such that it has monopoly 
power, and is sufficiently large, it will produce at its unconstrained level of output 
and demand an excess amount of quota, so that quota is withheld from the com­
petitive fringe in order to support the quota price. In each case the firm’s quota 
demand, and hence the equilibrium quota price, as well as its own short run profit, 
is increasing in its initial quota endowment. Total economic profit in the indus­
try, however, is strictly decreasing in the dominant firm’s initial quota allocation
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everywhere beyond the efficient level.
Where the dominant firm has market power in both quota and output markets, the 
behaviour of the firm is sensitive to the impact of both its own level of production 
and, through its quota demand, the level of production by the competitive fringe, 
upon the output price. All else equal, an increase in the firm’s quota demand 
increases the quota price both directly by reducing the residual quota supply to 
the (compliant) fringe and indirectly by restricting the fringe’s output and hence 
increasing the output price. As a result, the firm takes into account the impact of 
marginal changes in both its output and quota demand upon the market price for 
output and hence the quota price, as well as the direct impact of its quota demand 
upon the quota price determined in the competitive fringe. Now, unless the initial 
allocation to the dominant firm is zero, it may demand quota in excess of its level 
of output even if it is a net purchaser of quota. Thus, if it is profitable so to do, 
the firm will purchase quota in order to withhold it from the market. This result 
contrasts with that of previously published work. If the dominant firm’s initial
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quota allocation is zero, it will unambiguously be non-compliant, although even in 
the absence of enforcement the firm’s quota demand may then still be positive.
When the dominant firm is not constrained to matching its quota demand to its 
output, its quota demand is only increasing unambiguously in the initial quota 
allocation if the fringe quota demand and the consumer demand for output are 
assumed to be linear. Otherwise, the impact of a marginal change in the initial 
allocation is ambiguous. Likewise, the effect on total industry economic profits of 
altering the initial allocation to the dominant firm is ambiguous, depending inter 
alia upon the slope of the consumer demand curve.
The implications of oligopoly are briefly considered. In the case of market power 
in the quota market only, the results are similar to those obtained for a single 
dominant firm and a competitive fringe. For example, if one firm is holding excess 
quota, further increasing its initial quota allocation unambiguously reduces industry 
economic profit. Where firms have market power in both quota and output markets,
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we again have ambiguous results, for example in the effect upon total industry profits 
of reallocating quota endowments between oligopolistic firms.
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5. Market power with non-compliance
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we relax the assumption that all firms are quota compliant. We 
consider firstly the implications of a non-compliant dominant firm faced with a 
compliant fringe (the simplest case) and then go on to examine the case of a com­
pliant or non-compliant dominant firm faced with a non-compliant fringe. In the 
case of a dominant firm with market power in both quota and output markets, the 
comparative static expressions become very complex and ambiguous so that no clear 
results emerge.
5.2 A non-compliant dominant firm with a compliant 
competitive fringe
For a non-compliant firm with quota market power, the short run profit maximisa-
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max iti =  Bx (gi) -  r (ft -  Qi) [Qi -  Qi] -  Qi (vi; $)
91,Ql J
s.t. gi >  0, Qi >  0, (137)
where 0\ (ig; <E?) is the firm’s expected monetary penalty for a quota violation v± =  
vi (gi, Qi)- The Lagrangian and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum (<f> 
given) are
£  — Bi (gi) — r (ft — Qi) [Qi — Qi] — 9i (vi) , (138)
with
A  =  ^ ( i ) - ^ < 0 ,  « r > 0 ,  Aa* =  o, (139a)
CQ =  - r  (■) +  r' (■) [Qi -  Ql] -  d6^ X  <  0, QJ >  0, CqQ\ =  0. (139b)
For ql, Ql >  0, we have the first order necessary conditions
B( (ql) =  >  o (140)
and
B-I (Qi) =  - " q qX  >  0, (141)
where, as in the previous chapter,
K i(Q ;) =  r ( . ) - r ' ( . ) [ Q ; - Q i ]
tion problem is
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is the dominant firm’s marginal revenue from selling quota to, or its marginal cost 
of buying quota from, the competitive fringe. Subtracting (141) from (140) and 
rearranging, we obtain the joint decision rule
B( (<£) =  ( f t )  +
6 0 !(v, ) 08, (v,)
n r
dqi dQi
>  0. (142)
v m .  ^  * ^ 4 .  d01 ( v i )  d6i iyi)Where Qf >  q{, we assume that — — =  —— —  =  0 and hence we have
dqi oQ i
B i  (qD =  R i  =  0,
which, recall, was the condition for a compliant dominant firm withholding quota 
from the market. The implication here is that, if we allow the firm to be non- 
compliant, it will cheat wherever it has no incentive to hold excess quota. This has 
the obvious (and, in policy terms, not entirely trivial) corollary, as noted by Malik 
(2 0 0 2 ) in the context of pollution permits, that it is possible for a dominant firm to 
be “over-endowed” with quota such that it will not violate.
When the firm is cheating, if we maintain the assumption that V\ =  1 - - ■ ■1 in the
Qi
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expected penalty function 9j (.), we then have
dqi Qt
and
(143)
dQi iV ± ' Q l
so that (141) can be written
a M U l ) = - + t o ) 4 .  + 4 )
L _ J L  
Lft f t 2
(145)Bl(qt) = Ri ( f t ) - K M )
Here qf >  QI implies
0 <  Bi (ql)<  ( f t ) . (146)
When non-compliant, therefore, with expected penalties dependant upon relative 
violations, a firm with market power in the quota market produces where its marginal 
benefit of output is less than its marginal revenue from selling quota or its marginal 
cost of buying quota.1 From (143) and (144) we can also see that now
QX — ^'l — rr* (f) \ ^ 1 (M7\
H  =  u r n  =  1 (0 l)  <  ’ ( }
1 If the firm’s expected penalty was assumed to depend upon its level violation, on the other hand, we
would have Bi (gt) — Ri (Qt) > 0.
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Qi (qi)    .  , . ,—— =  — a, (r) <  1 .
ql r
From (147) we can observe that
Q I > Q i  =+ R\(QJ) >  r, s ; ( ?1* ) | r ,
Ql =  Qi =+ fli(QI) =  r, B'1 (g1* ) < r ,
Qi <  Qi =* Ri (QJ) <  (gi) <  r.
Thus if Firm 1 is a net purchaser of quota (QJ > Qi), it is possible that it will pro­
duce where B{ (ql) =  r. In this case, total industry production would be efficiently 
allocated, but, since the dominant firm is cheating, it would necessarily exceed ft. 
Otherwise, QJ <  Qi unambiguously implies B[ (gj) <  r. Note that where QJ — Qi,
the dominant firm behaves as a price taker in the quota market. Here we have
B' (a*)
Ri (QJ) =  r and hence <jJ (.) =  —-— —, as for a non-compliant competitive firm.
whereas, for a competitive non-compliant firm, recall from Chapter 3 that we had
5.2 .1 Comparative statics
In order to examine the effect of changing the dominant firm’s initial quota alloca-
132
tion, we totally differentiate the first order conditions (139a) and (139b) to obtain
£ qqdq +  CqQdQ =  0 (149)
and
CQqdq +  CQQdQ — v («) dQi, 
which can be rearranged and written in matrix form as
dqf
Cqq C qQ dQi 0
C qq C qq dQ\
.  r '  ( - )  .
. dQ i .
Using Cramer’s Rule we can then find
dq£ _  -C g Q T ' (Q 
dQi |F|
>  0
and
dQl Lqqr' (.)
> 0 ,
dQi \H\
where, from the second order sufficient conditions, we have
A s =  B'l (ql)-  =  B'l -  A  <  0>
together with
+ 1  = A «  <iQ A ?
(150)
(151)
(152)
(153)
(154)
(155)
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while the cross partial CqQ — Cqq is signed
CqQ dqidQ! 01 ^  Q f  +  01 ^  Q f >  ° ’ 1^56^
provided that 6'[ (ti].) > 0  (as is assumed). As for a compliant dominant firm which 
is not holding excess quota, therefore, both the catch and the quota demand are 
increasing in the initial quota allocation, although here, of course, non-compliance
j *
implies that qf >  Q f  We can see that, in general, - A -  #  —A ,  unless L qq =  —CqQ.
dQi dQi
d/r f ■ 1 dC^ *
As in the previous chapter, from r =  r (Gl — Q f  we know that f  — —r' (.) +
dQi dQi
and hence
dr(.) —Cqqr'(.)2
>  °* (157)
so that the quota price is again increasing in the initial quota allocation to the
dominant firm.
Since crj (Qi) =  ^ - ,  we can find 
Qi
(Qi) _  i d Q i_ Q l  
dQi qt dQi q f  dQi  ^ 1
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( Qi )  =  1  / > ' ( ■ )  | Qi + + ( ■ )
dQl ql |ff| q f '  |H|
=  ^  +  +  |  0. (159)
ql <
Here, as we had for a competitive non-compliant firm in Chapter 3,
and hence, using (152) and (153),
£qq "+■ (") £qQ
1
Q f J
B i (qf) -  d'l (v f
Vl .
(nA —
Q f  <
0'l MQj2 +  Qf,
B'i(ql)+cr U - ) « i ( + 7^ | 0 .
da* (Q 1 da* fT*!
Notice from (159) that, since r' (.) <  0, — r^=— -  takes the opposite sign to —
dQ 1 dr
which we derived in Chapter 3 for a competitive non-compliant firm. This implies
1 da*
that the dominant firm’s violation rate (— ) is initially decreasing (—-J- > 0 ) and
<rj dQi
da*
then increasing <  0 ) in its initial quota endowment, although it is difficult
dQi
to say exactly where over the firm’s quota demand QJ (Qi) this occurs. Notice,
dr (.)
though, that since here ■ >  0 , the relationship between the violation rate and
dQi
the (observed) quota price also takes the opposite sign to that for a non-compliant 
competitive firm. Therefore, where we have £ qq — — <rj (.) £ qq (hence B'[ (gj) —
—crj (,) i9j (ig) ), the value of Qi will be such that the violation rate is at a
Qi
minimum (i.e., a maximum value of <rj).
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Now let
q ( O i ) = < £ ( 0 i )  +  * ( 0 i )  (16°)
denote total industry output as a function of the initial allocation to the dominant 
firm Qi, with q*F (.) being the aggregate output of the competitive fringe. Then we 
can find the effect on total output of a marginal change in Qi as
gq (gi) = d £  . .
dQ, dQi dQL v ;
d(  ^ dd^  ^ dd^ *
With a compliant fringe, we know that —R  =  — — ~R and therefore we can
aQi dQ i dQx
write
<*q fgi) =  _  doi ,lfi2s
dQi dQi dQi’ ‘
and hence, using (152) and (153),
E E =~' wi + < °' (163)
Expression (163) implies that total production is initially decreasing and then in-
—  do* dd
creasing in Qi. Where Cqq +  CqQ =  0, we have - R  =  —R  and total output is
dQ i dQi
minimised (notice that this is not where the violation rate is minimised, which is
where Lqq +  a\ (.) CqQ =  0 ).
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In order to examine the effect of increasing enforcement effort, we assume as in
Chapter 3 that increasing 4>, all else equal, increases the slope of the expected penalty
30'
function, i.e., that we have >  0 . Now, holding the initial quota allocation Q\
constant, we can totally differentiate (139a) and (139b) to obtain
d6' 1
Cqqdq +  CqqdQ — (1^4)
and
n*
CQqdq +  CqqdQ =  * ~Q&d§, (165)
where
C qq  =  2r' (.) -  r "  (.) [Ql -  f t ]  -  2 0 ]  fo ) A  _  0 "  („,) <  0.  (166)
(167)
(168)
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The two equations can be rearranged and written in matrix form as
[ dqi 1 def i
Cqq C qQ d§ d§ Ql
. C Qq C q q  _ dQl del ql
L J d$ Q f _
Using Cramer’s Rule we can then find
dd[ _1_ 
dqi d§ Qf 
~d$ ~
C qq  +
*1 (O'
1^1
>
<
and
dQ\
d§
d6[ 
d$
A c  +  A c
[Q f  m q ;
de[
1+
[A? +  A  (■) A«1 
1+
| o , (169)
which is the same as the expression we found for a non-compliant firm without
market power. Here, notice, has the same sign as — i (Q1) Hence, if we
a<P dQi
d Q *
have C qq A  o\ ( 0) C qQ — 0 we will have ■ =  0, which implies a Q\ such that the 
non-compliant dominant firm has the same quota demand as an otherwise identical 
compliant dominant firm.2
q *
Since cr? (<J>) =  — we can also find
1V ; qt
dot ($) 
dA
JL
qi
dQt Qt
qf
dqf
(170)
2 Note th a t, if expected penalties depended simply upon level violations, by evaluating Cqq, Cqq and CqQ 
explicitly we would find dQl/d$  >  0 and dql/d§ <  0 everywhere. This conforms w ith Malik’s (2002) 
finding for a dominant firm in a T D P market.
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and hence, using (168) and (169),
da\ ($) 
d§
89[
d® [ Q f 99+  q j a
d9[ 
Ql d§
qf
1 d9[
qlQl d§
« !  (■)
1 ql
q+^qq +  q *2 ^ qQ
Cqq +  2CqQ +  <jJ (.) Cc
| ff|
> 0 , (171)
where
£ qq +  2CqQ +  <T J (.) £qq 
1
B'l {ql) -  ^  to) +  2
(■) 
i
*1(0 
+<jj (.)
~ B ' {  (ql) +  a\ (.) [2r'(.) -  (.) [QJ -  Qi]] < 0.
° i  w
2r' (.) -  r" (.) [QJ -  Q j  -  2*1 ( ©  ^  -  0'/ © )  | L
Provided that we have 2r' (.) — r" (.) [QJ — Qj.] <  0 (as in £qq for a compliant dom­
inant firm), increasing enforcement, as we would expect, unambiguously increases
crj (,) and hence reduces the firm’s violation rate.
5.3 A non-compliant dominant firm with output market 
power (compliant fringe)
For a non-compliant firm with both quota and output market dominance, the (ex-
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pected) profit maximisation problem is
max tit =  Bx (<?i,p(q)) - r  (O -  Qi,p(q)) [Qi -  Qi] -  6>i (^i) (172)
9111Q i
s.t. qx >  0 , Ql >  0 ,
where, as before, q =  qx +  qF is the total industry output and p (q) is the inverse 
consumer demand for that output, with p' (q) <  0. The fringe is still assumed to 
be compliant, so that qp =  Qf =  fl — Q%. The corresponding Lagrangian and 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
C — B\ {qx,p (q)) -  r (Q -  Qu p (q)) [Qx -  Qx] -  6X (^i) (173)
and
?; > 0 ,  A9i* =  0, (174a)
aBi(.) , dq dr (.) r _  ,  , _  K ) _  _9q_ r -  ,
Q  d p ( . ) p ^ d Q 1 ^  9 f t  ^  9p( q) p ^ 9 Q + x ^
- M h l l < 0 ,  f t  > 0 ,  (174b)
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For qfQ\ >  0, we have the first order necessary conditions
(175)
and
Ri (Qi) -  ft (q) ^  [<S -  [ «  -  Qi]] = -  ° ’
where we have again used ' 3  — Q* j'\ =  1- Here, as before,
dp{q) dp( q) 
Or (.)
Ri (Qt) s  r (.) + [Qt -  Qi]
(176)
is the dominant firm’s marginal revenue from selling or cost of purchasing quota.
Subtracting (176) from (175) and rearranging, we obtain
dBx (■) 
dqi +p’ (q)
dq dq
+
dqi dQi
d6i (vi) dOi (vi)‘ 
A
dq, i
(177)
da
As argued in the previous chapter, a compliant fringe implies that —— =  + 1  and
dqi
dq
dQi
— —1 , so that we have
(178)
and
Ri (Qi) +p'(q) [?i -  [Qi -  Qi]] =  - E E  "  ° (179)
141
LI r ddi (i/i) dO\{v i)
+  >  0 , (180)
and hence, from (177),
dB l{-] = R i(Q l)  +
dqi dqi dQi
which is identical to rule (142) for a non-compliant firm with market dominance only
dB ()
in the quota market. Here, we cannot have — 'L- * =  Ri (QJ) — 0, since Ri (QJ) =  0
dqi
requires QJ <  Qi, which in (178) and (179) would imply V^l\ — ) <  o
(which is not possible). From (178) and (179) we can see that non-compliance 
implies gj >  QJ and hence gj >  [QJ — Qi] and therefore
dBi (.) dOx to) 
dqi
and
> ~ dJ£ o f > °-
In order to examine the condition for non-compliance by the dominant firm, ob­
serve that free compliance (or over-compliance), i.e., gj <  QJ, implies (we assume)
0 0 i to) 0 0 i to)
09i dQi
dBi (.)
=  0 , so that we must have an (unconstrained) optimum where
+p7(q) t o - [ Q i - Q i ] ]  = o  (i8i)09i
142
Ri (Ql) + v‘ (q) [ql- [QI -  QJ] = o  (1 8 2 )
(■) _  D to * ' 1 -> n 
~ d + -  ~  Rl(0l) >  ° ’
Note that, as in the previous chapter, we cannot have Ri (Qf) — 0, since this
requires that QI < Qi, in which case we would have [ql — [QI — Qi]] >  0 and
hence p' (q) [q* — [QI — Qi]] <  0. If — R\ (Ql) >  0, on the other hand,
oqi
then from (181) and (182), given p' (q) <  0, we must have ql — [QI — Qi] >  0 and 
hence where q* <  QI we cannot have Qi =  0. If Qi =  0, therefore, the firm must be 
non-compliant, as we found previously. Recall from Chapter 4, however, that even 
in the absence of enforcement the non-compliant firm’s quota demand may still be 
greater than zero. Thus we can state the following result.
Result 5.1 When a firm has market power in both quota and output markets and 
is non-compliant, the firm will unambiguously cheat if its initial quota allocation is 
zero. Otherwise, the firm may cheat, comply or choose to hold excess quota.
and
and hence
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Note that, as in the case of a non-compliant firm with quota market dominance only,
q* — Q*
defining vi =  1 1  in the expected penalty function gives
Qi
ddx (ui) d$x (ni)
T*dqi dQi
<
0 and hence
d B l  W  <r R  ( n  
1 (Qi)
This implies that
QI <  Qi =4- B[ (qf < r,
as before, so that total production (although in excess of O) could be efficiently 
allocated if the dominant firm is a net purchaser of quota (which would necessarily 
be the case if Qi =  0).
5.3 .1 Comparative statics
We look firstly at the marginal impact of a change in the firm’s initial quota allo­
cation Qi. Totally differentiating the first order conditions (174a) and (174b) we
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obtain
dq —
Cqqdqi +  CqQdQi — p (q) fjffdQi
and
C,Qqdqi +  CQQdQi — 0 r W - p ' ( q )  9 q
dQi  ^ ^  dQi 
which can be rearranged and written in matrix form as
dQ i,
Cqq CqQ 
CQq C q q
[ dq\ 1
dQi
dQ\
- dQi .
- p '  (q)
dq
dqi
dr(.) dq
-  p (q)dQi dQi J
dq dq
Again setting —— =  +1 and =  — 1, we can then find
oqi dQi
dq{
dQi
~P ' ( q )  C qq dr (°) 
dQi +p'(q) CqQ
l#l <
and
A? p (q) AqdQ\ _ SQi P R
dQi 1*n
§ 0 ,
where
(184)
(185)
(186)
(187)
(188)
\H| — Cqq£,QQ CqQ >  0.
The form of (187) and (188) is identical to that encountered for the unconstrained 
compliant model, although here the second order conditions differ somewhat. Now,
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we have
 ^ _ d 2Bi (.) , dq
q ~  dq2 dqi
+ V" (q)
<9q
dqi.
where, if
Qi
del (vi)
Qq2 to) n*2’
JL_
QJ2
(189)
together with
+ Q  =  - 2 ^ - ^ [ « - 0 1] - p ' ( q ) 5q0Qi dQ2
+ p" (q)
<9q
dQi
+  p '(q )^ 3 .
P
dQi
f e * - [ « - O i ] ] - ^ 5 l l < 0 > (190)
where
ggj fa) =  on' r„) I 0" r„ 11 ll  
9Qf l ( l ) Q f  l ( 0 Q54’
and
£gQ -^ Qg —P (q)
<9q dq
dQi dqi_
where
+ b S I !  <«■
(191)
f g -  +  A
Again, (187) and (188) are very difficult to sign. Even if we assume linearity in p (q)
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d2r (.)
and r («), so that p" (q) =  0 and 2 =  0 , as well as in 6i (vi), so that 9'[ (vi) =  0
oQi
(with the result that we can sign CqQ >  0 ), the sign of both expressions remains
<9q <3q
ambiguous. Specifically, with —— =  + 1  and -7—— =  — 1 , we now find
dqi dQi
dqj
dQi
-p '  (q)
\R
dr (.) ‘
dQi +p (q)J- 2 p ' ( q ) + 0 x M ) q . 2
if \2 (^l) /-\*o
v (q) Ql2 2 p ' ( q ) ^ - p ' ( q  ) +  ^
|ff| (192)
and
dQ\
dQi
dr (.) ‘
w h , ( , ) dq2
p'(q)
+
1^1
- 2 p' (q) +  8\ M ) M
dr(-)
dQl
\ H \
d2Bj (.) .  , . ,
 +  +  2p'(q)
dqj
+  Wl < 0 .
(193)
When the dominant firm with market power in the output market is non-compliant, 
therefore, the marginal effect of a change in its initial quota endowment Qi is, in 
general, difficult to predict. Likewise, we cannot predict with certainty the effect of 
a marginal change in the initial quota allocation on either the firm’s violation rate 
<rl (») or the total industry output q.
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The marginal effect of changing the level of enforcement is also found to be ambigu­
ous. If we define vi =
q* — Q* -
1 1, then for a given value of Qi, we have, as before,
Q i
de[ j _  
dqi d$ Qt 
d$ “  jfff
1
o'! (O'
_| 7-7-7 TqQ
0, (194)
where, in the linear example, we find
-2?E+p'(q)- 29'iWi +S ■2p' (q) +  «i («,) A
=  +  P' («0 -  ( A  -2L -  2± p '  (q) +  (v,) A
dQi qi3 o r Qi
- 2 ± U  +
SQi
1 - 2 ^
QiJ
9i >p' (q) -  °l Ei) g*3 < 0 .
We also have
_ A i  A  
dQ\ aa> Qi .A  (■)
Bqq 4-
m
l | o , (195)
where
A  (■)
•Vqcjr +  R jQ — IL
Q!
d2Ri (.) ;
— + V ( q )dg2 2p# (q) +  0i Ei)
1_
Qt dq\ H- 2
«L
LQi p’ (q) + #i Ei) q*2 %°-
Where the dominant firm also has market power in the output market and is non-
compliant, the marginal impact of changing levels of enforcement effort is ambiguous
with respect to both output and quota demand. Note that if we defined the violation
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in level terms, this ambiguity would disappear with respect to quota demand (where 
dQ*
we would have >  0) but not output.
As before, we can find
dal (J) _  1 dQl Ql dqi
d$ ql d§ q f (196)
as
t o  (£)
d§
1
de[
d§ Ql (■)
Zqq +  At?
Ql
Ql
q f
d§ Ql £ qq + *t (■)
'qQ
1^ 1
t o  (■)
Cqq +  CqQ +
Fi
£ qq + al (.)'
Evaluating the terms within the brackets, we obtain, again for the linear example,
1
o i t o  (■)
Cqq +  C qQ
1
+  ~  
Ql
£ q q  +
*1 (■)'
q td 'B ii.)  2 1 dr(.) |
Q f  dq\ ql dQi
' t o  t o  12- t o  — 4------1-----
. Q f Ql <& p' (q) 1 0
In general the sign of (196) is therefore ambiguous, although notice that the term
„ Qi t o  1 o_i± 4------ 1-----
L Q f QI t o
Q *
pr (q) above becomes negative for values of <rj (.) =  - ~  of
Qi
around 0.6 or less, in which case is unambiguously positive.
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5.4 A non-compliant fringe
Non-compliance in the competitive fringe, as we have seen, alters the price elasticity 
of individual firms’ quota demands and hence the elasticity of the equilibrium quota 
price with respect to the (residual) quota supply to the fringe. In Malik’s (2002) 
model of an emissions permit market, expectations of penalties for non-compliance 
by firms in the fringe were assumed to depend upon the size of their violations in 
level terms. As a result of this assumption, fringe quota demands become everywhere 
more elastic if firms are non-compliant and hence the fringe inverse quota demand 
r (h) is everywhere less elastic than that of a compliant fringe. For any given residual 
quota supply [Q — Ql], the equilibrium quota price is then always lower than with 
an otherwise identical compliant fringe.
When expected penalties are assumed to depend upon relative violations, however, 
we found that non-compliant competitive firms’ quota demands are more price elastic 
at low quota prices then become increasingly less elastic as the quota price increases,
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until a point is reached where the demand elasticity starts to increase again as the 
quota price increases further. As a result, the fringe inverse quota demand will 
tend to be less elastic than the compliant inverse demand at relatively high or low 
residual quota supplies but more elastic at intermediate quota supplies. We have 
seen that whereas the equilibrium quota price is lower than with a compliant fringe 
at a relatively high (residual) quota supply, at relatively low quota supplies we can 
have an equilibrium quota price that is higher than if the fringe were compliant.
Let Qi (r; <f>) be a competitive firm’s quota demand at a quota price r and a level of
enforcement d>. Since, by increasing the slope of firms’ expected penalty functions,
increasing enforcement reduces competitive firms’ rates of non-compliance (i.e., all
else equal, increasing firms’ choice of cq), changing the enforcement parameter 4> in
dQi (t" $)
Q i  (r; <b), where we have — —-  <  0, gives the following predicted effects upon 
firms’ quota demands at a given quota price, and upon the equilibrium quota price 
for a given residual quota supply.
151
in Chapter 3 we will have, at relatively low quota prices,
PQi(0 >  n (0 . n 
d rd®  ’ 9 $  ’
while at relatively high quota prices we will have
PQi(0 „  n g g jW
9r93> “  ’ 9$  ’
with, at intermediate quota prices,
d2f t ( 0 rf| 8Qi ( . ) > 
d-rd<l> ’ 9$  <
At some intermediate quota price we will then observe
a2ft ( -)  , n  9 f t O  =
9r9$ ’ 9$
as increasing enforcement, all else equal, increases a firm’s elasticity of quota demand 
but has no effect. Upon the magnitude of its demand.
If expected penalties depend upon relative quota violations, then from the results
Similarly, if we denote the fringe inverse quota demand r (Qf ] <f>), where Qf =
2 Qi ( r > ^ ) >  ^ i e n  w e  e x P e c t
92r(.)
dQFd$ ~  ’ <9$
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at relatively high residual quota supplies and
d2r (.) dr («)
< 0 , — E  < 0,dQFd§ -  ’ d$ 
at relatively low quota supplies, but
d2r (•) ^  n Sr{.) >  
dQFd$ ’ 03> <
at intermediate quota supplies. There is some quota supply, then, at which we have
0V( .)  >Qj 0r M  _
dQFd§  ’ d$
where increasing enforcement reduces the (negative) slope of the fringe inverse quota 
demand curve but has no effect upon the equilibrium quota price.
If expected penalties are a function of the level violation, on the other hand, then 
following Malik (2002) we would simply have
PQi(■). n SQ A )
0r0$ ’ 0$
and
d2r (.) dr (.)
w  <  0, — R - >  0
dQFd<S> ’ d§
everywhere.
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5 .4 .1  The impact of fringe non-compliance on a compliant dominant 
firm
To begin with, we investigate the effect of a non-compliant fringe when the domi­
nant firm has market power in the quota market only and is compliant.3 We start 
by examining the impact of fringe non-compliance on the equilibrium quota price. 
Following Hahn (1984) and Malik (2002), we here use the dual of the compliant 
dominant firm’s profit maximisation problem, which can be written
where QF {ri,<&) =  X) Qi (ri! and Q i — ft — Q f (^i;$). The corresponding
i—2
Lagrangian is therefore
max tti =  Hi (gi) -  rx [ft -  QF (n; $) -  Qx]
<2 i , n  L J
s.t. q, >  0, n  >  0, q! <  Qu (197)
N
£  =  B 1 (gi) -  n  [ft -  Qp (.) -  Q j  -  Al [gi -  Qi] (198)
3 It is quite possible (and perhaps likely) th a t a single dominant firm may be accorded sufficient attention 
by the enforcement authorities th a t it is effectively forced into compliance, whereas firms in the competitive 
fringe are non-compliant.
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and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are
A  =  A t e ) - A ; < 0 , 0, £,<£ =  0,
A  =  -  [fi -  Qf (.) -  <5J +  [A -  AJ] A A A  <  o, rj >  0, A A  =  o,
or i
£\ = -q t  + Qi > 0, a; > 0, CxXt = 0.
For qt ~  Qi >  0 and r\ >  0, we then have, solving for Ai>
-  [fi -  Qf(.) -  Qi] +  [ri -  BI (rf)] =  0 .
Totally differentiating (200) (holding Qi constant) we obtain
'B'l Ei) " ^   ^  ^dqx +  Crrdri + 9 Q + ) + [ r . _ B, 02Qf (.)'
drid§
dA ■
and hence
D// f „*\ dQp (0 dqi drx
A  A  ~ g ^ ~  ■ M  + 9Q f ^  +  [rj -  AJ)] 92Qf WdridQ
or, equivalently, since here dqi =  dQi =  —dQF (.),
Rn(^ d Q F (0 dQF (.) dn 
Bl {qi> ~dT, +  C" m  +
9Q f (■) . r .  pt ,  . . .  d*QF (.)■ 
~ W ~  +  [ri -  Bl (?l)1 ~dEd¥-
Now we can find
dri
dA
B’l fe ) R R  ■ R R  + R R  + h* -  (tf)] Q2Qf Wdri d$ d§ drid$
Cr
(199b)
(199c)
(200)
= 0 
= 0,
=  0. 
(201)
(199a)
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Provided that we have Crr <  0 from the second order sufficient conditions, the sign 
d/r i
of is the same as that of the RHS numerator term in brackets. If we have 
d$
q q f m d2Qp (.)
— 7—— >  0 and ——— - f -  >  0 , for example (as in the case of the level violation 0$ or id$
model), and if the dominant firm is exercising monopoly power in the quota market
dv\
so that rl >  B[ (ql), then is unambiguously positive, i.e., reducing (increasing)
non-compliance in the fringe increases (reduces) the equilibrium quota price. If
the firm is exercising monopsony power in the quota market, on the other hand,
so that [r* — B[ (g£)] <  0, then with >  0 and ^ ^  ^  >  0 the sign of
d$ drid$
dvx
becomes ambiguous. By a somewhat different approach, Malik (2002) finds
analogous results in a permit market with expected penalties dependent upon level
violations.4 If in (201) we had <  0  and <  0, however, the sign of
d$ drxd$
dv\
is still ambiguous where the dominant firm is exercising monopsony power in the 
quota market (r'l <  B{ (ql)) but it is unambiguously negative when the dominant 
firm is exercising monopoly power (rj >  B{ (qf)). Here, reducing (increasing) non-
4 Instead of explicitly modelling the effect of changing enforcement effort, Malik (2002) simply applies a 
scaling factor to the size of fringe firms’ violations.
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compliance in the fringe reduces (increases) the equilibrium quota price.
When the dominant firm is holding excess quota, we have B[ (ql) =  AJ =  0 in (200) 
and hence expression (201) becomes
0Qf (.) + 2Q f( - ) '
dri I 1 drid® 1 (202)
d<E> Cr.
Now the sign of ^  depends only upon that of ancj f  wloich gives
d§ 3$ dnd®
the same results as the previous expression for the case of monopoly power. These
results are summarised below in Table 5.1.
In order to investigate the impact of fringe non-compliance upon the dominant firm’s
quota demand, we return to the primal of Firm l ’s profit maximisation problem when
compliant. For QJ =  gj >  0, recall from Chapter 4 that we had
- r  (SI -  Ql) + r ' ( n -  Ql) [QJ -  Q j  +  =  0,
where we have substituted B[ (ql) for AJ in the first order condition for QJ. Totally
differentiating this expression, again holding Qx constant, we obtain
[ B q q  +  C q q \  d Q i  - f -
d r(f d2r (■) r _  .  ,
o q f (.) aa>
ci$ =  0,
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given that QI =  qt and hence clqi — dQ\. Thus we can find 
dQi
0r(.) 02r(.) r
F ( \ IVi Qu0$  <9QF (.) d$
(203)
C qq  +  C qq
When the dominant firm is holding excess quota, we have B[ (gj) =  X\ =  0 and 
(203) becomes
9 r (■) . & r (■) ro. _  q  ] 
dQ, [  0 $  +  0 Q F  ( . )  0 $
d$ Tqq
In either case, provided that Cqq, Cqq <  0 from the second order sufficient condi­
tions, the sign of -9 c  is the same as that of the numerator term in brackets. If 
dr (,) d2r (.)
• —— >  0 and ———t-7" „ ■ <  0 (as would be the case everywhere with a level vio-
<9$ dQp («) d<h v J
rlD
lation ai'gument in the fringe firms’ expected penalty functions), the sign of —R  is 
ambiguous when Firm 1 is exercising monopoly power ([Qt — Q f  <  0) but is un­
ambiguously negative when it is exercising monopsony power in the quota market.
Again, Malik (2002) finds analogous results with his model of a permit market. On
dr (a) d2r («)
the other hand, where, for example, we have - <  0 and —- —R —  <  0, the sign
d$ dQF (-) d$
dQi r -  ,
of —— is ambiguous when Firm 1 is exercising monopsony power ( [Q* — Q f >  0)
but is unambiguously positive when it is exercising monopoly power in the quota
market.
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Dominant firm behaves as a 
Monopsonist Neither Monopolist
Fringe inverse demand
dr dQi dr dC) 1 dr dQi
d$ d$ d$ d$ d$ d$
Low r (high Qp) ? — + ~ ?
+ — - + —
i + ? + — ? —
+ + 0 0 — —
i ? + — + — ?
- + — + — +
High r (low Qp) ? + ? +
Table 5.1. Impact of fringe non-compliance on a dominant firm.
The impact of fringe non-compliance on a compliant firm with quota market dom­
inance is smnmarised in Table 5.1. In the case of a level violation argument in the 
fringe firms’ expected penalty functions, the results are as shown in the top line 
in bold type and concur with those derived by Malik (2002) for a pollution permit 
market. In the case of expected penalty functions containing a relative violation 
argument, the results depend upon the position of the residual quota supply on the 
fringe (inverse) demand curve r(Q F]$). When the dominant firm is behaving as 
a monopolist in the quota market, for example, non-compliance in the fringe can 
reduce the quota price and increase the dominant firm’s quota demand where the
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fringe inverse quota demand r (■) is relatively low, but have the opposite effect where 
the fringe inverse quota demand is relatively high, with non-compliance increasing 
both the quota price and the dominant firm’s quota demand at some intermedi­
ate point on the fringe inverse demand curve. The converse then holds when the 
dominant firm is exercising monopsony power in the quota market.
Notice that, if expected penalties depend upon relative violations, where the residual
quota supply to the fringe is relatively high on its inverse demand curve, we have 
dQi
-rjTj- <  0 when the dominant firm is exercising monopoly power in the quota market.
Here we have the possibility that fringe non-compliance may induce the dominant
firm to hold quota off the market. The corollary is that increasing enforcement effort
in the fringe may lead to the dominant firm not withholding quota. The opposite is
the case where the residual quota supply to the fringe is relatively low in relation to
its inverse demand curve. Here, increasing enforcement in the fringe makes it more
likely that the dominant firm withholds quota. With expected penalties assumed
AO
to depend upon level violations, however, the sign of is everywhere ambiguous
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when the dominant firm is exercising monopoly power in the quota market.
To see the impact of fringe non-compliance upon the (compliant) dominant firm’s 
profits, we apply the Envelope Theorem to the primal of the firm’s profit maximi­
sation problem to obtain
< » >
dcK
Thus, when the firm is exercising monopoly power, the sign of is the same as 
dr (»)
that of ^  , i.e., if increasing enforcement in the fringe increases the quota price, 
it also increases the firm’s profits. The opposite is the case if the dominant firm is 
exercising monopsony power in the quota market.
The effect is similar if the dominant firm is non-compliant. We can affirm this 
as follows. Recall that the necessary first order conditions for a non-compliant 
dominant firm were
p, » i W  n
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and
- r ( . ) + r ' ( . ) [ Q ; - Q 1] - ^ h i i  =  0.
Assuming that there is a change only in enforcement of the fringe, not the dominant 
firm, which we will denote by we can totally differentiate these first order
conditions to obtain
Cqqdqi +  CqQdQi - 0 (206)
and
^Qqdqi +  CQQdQi +
dQpd^F
which we can rearrange and write in matrix form as
d$F =  0,
' dqi ‘
Cqq CqQ d<& p
dQi
f -
0
° r {-) d2r (.) , -  ]
dQpdbp *- 1 \3$
Then we can find
dqi
d&p
dr (.) d2r (.)
£«
_  d^p dQpd^p [Qi — Qi] £ qq
- C qQ
m
dr (.) d2r (.)
d§p dQpd&p
~ W \
[<35 -  <3i]
(207)
(208)
(209)
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and
dQi
d$ j?
Cqq 0
9r(0 _  9V(.)  ro, _  «  ,
£ qq
\ H \
dr (.) <92r (.) [ft -  QJ
+1
0.
Given that we have Cqq <  0 and C qq >  0 with \H\ =  C qqC,QQ — C?Q >  0, both
(210)
dqi
d$ p
and here have the same sign as 
d$F
dQi
d<5>
dr (■) d2r (.)
. d$ dQF (.) d$ [ Q I  -  Q i ]
Cqq 4“ Cqq
which we derived for a compliant dominant firm with a non-compliant fringe.
We can also find
do\ ($ F) _  1 dQl _  Qj dqj 
d$ F q\ d$ q f d$
as
dol ($F) 
d$ f
dr (.) d2r (.)
d$F dQFd$F [Qt ~ Qi]
ql
- c qQ d$.91
i f
dr (.) d2r (.)
m
dr(.) d2r(.) . -  '
dQFd$ F^ft
d$F dQFd $F [ Q I  -  Q i ]
1_ [Cqq + Q~i £qQ]
K  ' l#l
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where
C q q  +  (T1 (.) C qQ  —
Q i
. QI 
' * 
9i «i («*) 5 3  +  «I | L
=  A'(9i*) +  A ( - ) « i ( + Q p | 0 .
Even if we sign A  and 7 1, however, the sign of — 4 ——^ is ambiguous, depend- 
dQp dQp clQj?
ing inter alia upon the dominant firm’s quota demand and the extent of its violation.
It is possible that fringe non-compliance could increase or decrease cheating by the
dominant firm and even induce a dominant firm to move from cheating to holding
excess quota or vice-versa.
5.4 .2  The impact of fringe non-compliance on a dominant firm with 
output market power
We now let the (compliant) dominant firm have market power in the output market 
as well as in the quota market. Assume, to begin with, that expected penalties
in the fringe depend upon the level violation size. In this case, B[ (qf) =  r (.) in
dr (>)
the fringe and hence we still have _ . . =  1 in the first order conditions. Also,
dP Vi)
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dBi f e )  dr(.) , . t  .1
-- - - 7  :■ =  _ /  -v =  1 implies that
0p(q) dp( q)
dqi __ tig  1 (r(.);p(q)) _  OB) 1 (.) | dB[ 1 (■) Q
dp{q) dp(q) 5p(q) dr (.)
so that
0q =  1 dgjr
%  091 ’
as before. All else equal, if in the fringe we maintain B[ (q*) — r (.), then a change
in the output price does not change the fringe output. Although, given market
clearing, we still have
3q dqp
dQi dQi EN dB{ dr (.) _  dqF < 0*=2 dr (.) dQi dQF
dn
now qF >  Qf and hence we cannot assume that — =  1 since the slope of the
d Q F
fringe (inverse) quota demand now differs from that of the aggregate marginal benefit
curve. The assumption that expected penalties in the fringe depend upon level
violations means that the fringe inverse quota demand becomes less elastic, which
implies that <  1 and hence > — 1 . 
d Q F  d Q i
T_ 3q 3q 3q dq _ . _ ,
It 7 ;— =  1 but 7—— > —1, then tt-b tttv >  0 and hence we now haveto dQi dqi dQi
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where
If expected penalties in the fringe depend upon the relative violation size, on the
principal effect of non-compliance in the fringe is to alter the slope of the inverse 
quota demand curve, it does not fundamentally alter the general conclusions.
In order to formally examine the impact of fringe non-compliance upon the equilib­
rium quota price, we again use the dual of the dominant firm’s profit maximisation 
problem, which in this case is
max 7Ti =  Bi (qu p (q)) -  n  [Q -  QF (ru p (q); $) -  Q f
91,7*1
s.t. qi >  0, ri >  0, gi < Qi, (211)
where, as before, Qi — Cl — QF (.). The corresponding Lagrangian is
C =  Ri (.) -  ri [Cl -  Qf (d) -  Q f -  Xi [gi -  Qi] (212)
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and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an optimum are
r -  dB' M +
, _ + T  +
9Bl ^  +  K  -  All ^dp( q) dp (q) _
P ' ( q ) g - A l < 0 ,
(213a)
r _  dBi (.) , N <9q 0Qf(O ro o n  1 i r * \*i (0 ^  n
r _ 9p(q) 9QW-)' dr, [ Qp (,) Ql] + M Al 37 £ 0,dri
rl >  0, Lrr\ =  0, (213b)
£\ -  -q l + Qi > o, a; > 0, £aAI = 0. (213c)
For ql — Qi >  0, we have the first order conditions
ggi to
dqi + <71 + If f -A H
9 ft -(■)
dp (q) _ P' ( q ) g - A l  =  0 (214)
and
ilp' (q) + +  ■ -  [« -  Q+(0 -  QJ + K  -  a;] = o, (215)dQF (.) <9ri dri
where gf =  ^ 7 , together with £ A =  0. Here, At >  0. 
dp{ q) ' ^
Totally differentiating the first order conditions, we obtain
C\\dXi +  C\qdqi +  C\rdri +  C \§d $ — 0 , (216)
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C q \ d \ i  "4“ C q q d ( f a  ~ (“  Cqrdri +  C q ^ d A  —  0 (217)
and
Cr\dX\ +  jC,rqdcfa A £ rrdvi A Cr$d& — 0, (218)
which we can write as
Cxx Cxq Cxr
CqX rf-qq r*-*qr
CrX rJ~^rq £ rr
dX1
d$
dqi
d§
dri
LdiE
—C\§
Cq<&
Crq>
where £\q, =  0 with
(219)
=  ri -  a ; ± M ! P- (q) A0p( q )0 3 +  ( > dqi
and
Cr<b =  q\p' (q)
dq OQf (.) +  dq d2QF (B)
dQi?(.)d4> dri OQf (.) drid<& 
We can now find
g o ,
where the determinant of the bordered Hessian H  is
+ Q F (.) *<?„( . )
+ ^ ^ +|ri
Cxx Cxq o.
CqX r^qq Cqq>
iT-I CrX rA-'rq
i* i
1*1
C\\ C\q C\r 
CqX Cqq Cqr 
CrX Crn Cj q t^rr
dQF (.)
dri
(220)
Cqq — Crr A 2dQF (■)
dri Cqr A 0,
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given that
A w =  A , a =  - i , A ,  =  A *  = A u  =  0.
Since C\x =  0, the numerator determinant in (220) can be evaluated as
0 CXq 0
£q\ ddqq Cq<&
Cr\ Crq Cr§
=£xa£
vlp' (q)
Xq'-'qX
CxqCrX
9iV (q)
OQf (.)
dm
=  ~£xq 
dq
C q X  £ q &  
C-rX £ r$
Cxq [ £qx£r$ d~ £ r\£q<$\
dQF („) 3q d2QF (.)
dQp (.) 3$  3n  dQp (.) dnd® _
(■) +  [rj _  AJ] ^  (■)
h* -  AJ]
3q
3$ ' drid<s>
i Q A y  , { ) dq 
dp (q) 3$ 3gi _
dQp (.) +  3q d2Qp (.)
_dQF (■) 3$ 3ri 3Qj? (.) 3ri3<&
32Qf (.) , ,  . 3q
+  +  [r» -  AJ] ^  (0
3<E> 3ri3ff>
r! -  A
lj dp(q)d$ P^  dq.
>
< 0.
drg
The sign of —  therefore depends upon the signs of the two bracketed terms in the
expression above. In the first bracketed term, we have the “conjectural” derivative
^ , where
dQp(-)
dq _  dqF dqi dqF
dQp (.) dQp (.) dQp (.) dQp (■) ’
together with =  q7T~7T oT - Here) f°r a non-compliant fringe,dQp (.) 3$  dQp (.) 3 $ ' ’ *  & 5 3QF (.)
3q
and hence ———j-r is positive whether expected penalties are assumed to depend 
dQp (»)
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upon level or relative violations.0 The sign of 7- 7:—.. —  and hence 7—— . . ■ is
dQF (.) d$ 6Qf (.) d$
zero with a level violation argument, but is ambiguous if expected penalties depend
(9
upon relative violations.6 If, as in the case of a level violation argument for example,
5q 9q
> 0  and 7—-— =  0 , the sign of the first bracketed term is ambiguous
dQF (.) dQF (.)d$
dQp  (*) 9 2Q f  ( )given — > 0 and — —-CCL >  0. Where expected penalties depend upon 0$  0^ 0$
relative violations, the sign of is, in general, ambiguous.
a$
If the dominant firm is not constrained to be compliant, or is holding excess quota, 
we have =  0 and we can ignore the constraint. The first order conditions Lq and 
Cr can then be totally differentiated to give
C q q d q i  +  C q r d r i  +  £ q§ d $  =  0 (221)
and
Crqdqi +  £ rrdri +  Cr§d$ =  0 , (2 2 2 )
5 In  either case, we have both ^  >  0 and ^  ^  >  0.
dr dr
6 This will depend upon whether the relative violation ra te  is increasing or decreasing in the quota price.
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which we can write in matrix form as
dqi
\ rt-'qq r  1'-'qr d $ C q §
r rq rj~>rr dri — C rQ
L d$
(223)
We can then find
drx
d$
Cqq Cqify
Crq
1 ° . (224)
where
| i f  | — LqqLrr ~  £?qr >  0
and
'qq
r
Cq(f>
— =  - C qq
q{p’ (q)
dq dQF {.)+  dq (.)
dQF (.)d § dri dQF (f drxd§
^ ( ■ ) + [ r . _ A. f y Q F (.)
+.£-rq
0$
. 92Qf (-) . dq
. 1 dp (q) 04? w  dqK
drid4>
where Cqq <  0 and
Crq — Cqr P (q)
dq dQp (.) * „ dq dq dQF (.)
dQF (.) dri
+  q$p"( q ) - ^
dqi dQF (.) dri
* , ,  x dq d2QF (.) i / \ dq_
qiP (q) W f(.)3p(q (q) Wi +
' * M 0  (■)"T I idp(q) 1dp(q)dri_ p'(q) ^ > 0  0g i <
dri
Here again, the sign of — -  is generally ambiguous.
d$
In order to examine the impact of fringe non-compliance upon the dominant firm’s
quota demand, as before we use the primal of the firm’s profit maximisation problem.
171
Here, for Ql =  ql >  0 we had the first order conditions
dBi (.) *  ,
(q )^
AJ — 0 (225)
and
r  _  9 q  _ , N  M O  rr> .£q — q±p (q) r (■) htt-  [QiaQi aQi ^]-|Sp'(q)S [QI- Oil+A’=0’
(226)
together with £ A — —qt +  Ql =  0. Totally differentiating these first order conditions
and rearranging terms, we obtain
where £ A$ =  0, with
~dxr
£ \ \  £ \ q  £ \ Q
d$
dqi
7X
—£ A$
£ q \  £ q q  C q Q = £q<I>
£ Q X  ^ Q q  £ Q Q _
d $
dQi
I d$ J
_ - £ q#_
(227)
and
£ q$ — - o V  (q) ^ +  ro* _  0 , 1QlP J dQp4> 9$ dQpd'b ^
+
a2r (.) +  dr(a) d2qF
dp(q)d$ dQp dp( q) dQpd$_ p' (q) [Qi -  Qi] >
where we have used
^  dqi dqF dqF dqF
~raQi aQi aQi dQl dQp
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We can then find
Cxx t o — C x q
CqX C q q C qQ
dQi B q x tog ~ £ qq
d$
1 ^ 1
where the determinant of H  is
H
CxX C\q C\Q
qqC q X  Cnn £r,
C qx C-Qq C qq 
and the numerator determinant can be evaluated as
— [Cqq +  C qq +  2C qr\ >  0
C\\ C\q 
f-^ qX f-'qq 
CqX CQq
- C x q
~£q<&
-Cqq
0
CqX '-'qq 
£ qX f-'Qq
Cxq
£n
0
C qQ
C qq
-cX q C qX —£q C qx —C (;
— Cxq [—£ qx£QQ +  Cq\C<&] =  CqQ +  CqQ
d2qF
= -  qlp' (q)
+
+
OQFd§  
d2r (.)
d rQ  ffV(-) [n* _  o  1
94> dQFd® l-Ql
dqF +  dr(,) d2qF
dp(q)d§ dQF dp (q) dQpd§_
> 0
[ « - « ■ !
(228)
(229)
given that here we have
Cxq — £ qx — —1, Cxq =  Cqx =  4-1, Cxx — 0.
If expected penalties in the fringe were assumed to depend upon level violations, 
so that non-compliant firms set B[ (q*) =  r, in the above expression we would have
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dv (■) ' d^v
— =  1 and hence -  . =  0. The determinant then simplifies to
dp (q) dp (q) <9$
dr (.) d2r (.) d2qF „ . . . .
With —  >  0 and <  0 everywhere, but —  =  0, the sign or this
<9$ dQFd<& dQFd$
expression is negative if [QJ — Q f  >  0 but ambiguous if [QJ — Q f  <  0. If expected
penalties in the fringe depend upon relative violations, however, individual fringe
dr (.)
firms set B[ (qf) =  a* (r) r so that we do not (necessarily) have -  - ■ =  1 and
d2r (■)
— 0 and the expression cannot be simplified. In general, therefore, the
dp (q) <9$
sign of is ambiguous here. 
a®
Where Q f qt are unconstrained we have
where
'dqi '
Cqq C qQ Cq<&
C"Qq C q Q_ dQi C q $
L d$ J
(230)
and hence
dQi
~dA
Cqq Cq$
£ Qq ‘Cq<! >
1^ 1
0, (231)
| i f  | =  C q q C Q Q  ~  £ qQ >  0
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and
Bqq CqQ 
CQq C qq
— CqqCQQ T CQqCqQ
=  - c qq
+
„ y  (q) dCz_ * + )  +  a V (-) rn* _  0,1
9lP W  dQFd$ dQfd§
d2r (.) dqF dr (.) d2qF
_dp(q)d$ dQF dp( q) dQpd^ v' (q) [Qt -  Qi ]
+ cQq ‘ ' " A w l ? [ « ! - « . ]dp (q) d$ dqi < 0,
so that the sign of js again ambiguous.
5.5 Conclusion
In this penultimate chapter, the impact of market power combined with non-compliance
was investigated. We firstly examined the case of a non-compliant dominant firm
faced by a compliant competitive fringe, with the dominant firm having market
power in the quota market only. If the firm’s expected penalty is assumed to be
a function of its relative violation, when cheating the firm now produces where its
marginal benefit of output is less than the marginal revenue from selling quota or
the marginal cost of purchasing quota, with the ratio between these equal to the
ratio of quota demand to output. Where the non-compliant dominant firm is ex-
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ercising monopsony power in the quota market, we have the possibility that (by 
chance) production is efficiently allocated between it and the competitive fringe, 
although here total output would of course exceed the TAC. As Malik (2002) notes 
for the analogous case in a pollution permit market, it is possible for the dominant 
firm to be sufficiently well-endowed with quota that it holds excess quota at market 
equilibrium and is therefore compliant.
When the dominant firm is non-compliant, increasing its initial allocation unambigu­
ously increases its output, its final quota demand and the equilibrium quota price. 
Hence, as with a compliant dominant firm, the firm’s apparent quota demand curve 
is upward, rather than downward, sloping. The non-compliant firm’s violation rate 
is firstly decreasing, and then increasing, as its initial quota allocation (and hence 
the observed quota price) is increased. Total industry output also decreases and then 
increases as the initial allocation to the dominant firm is increased. There appears 
to be some initial quota allocation at which total output is minimised, although this 
does not coincide with the dominant firm’s minimum violation rate.
176
If the (non-compliant) dominant firm has the ability to exercise market power in both 
quota and output markets, we concluded that the firm will cheat unambiguously if 
its initial quota allocation is zero. Otherwise, as we found in Chapter 4, the firm may 
cheat, comply, or hold excess quota. Again, if the dominant firm is a net purchaser 
of quota (which would necessarily be the case for a compliant firm if its initial quota 
endowment were zero), industry production (although in excess of the TAC) could 
be efficiently allocated. With non-compliance, the comparative statics with respect 
to both the dominant firm’s initial quota allocation and the enforcement effort of 
the regulator are messy and ambiguous in sign.
Next we examined the implications of non-compliance in the competitive fringe. If 
fringe expected penalties are assumed to depend only upon level violations, recall, 
the effect of non-compliance in the fringe is to increase the elasticity of firms’ quota 
demands, hence to everywhere reduce fringe quota demands at a given quota price, 
and hence, for a given residual quota supply to the fringe, to everywhere reduce the 
equilibrium quota price. If expected penalties are assumed to depend upon relative
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violations, on the other hand, the effect of non-compliance on individual fringe quota
demands depends upon the quota price, and, as a consequence, the effect upon the 
equilibrium quota price depends upon the residual quota supply. At relatively low 
or high quota prices, for example, we would expect non-compliance to increase the 
elasticity of firms’ quota demands, but to have the opposite effect at intermediate 
quota prices. At relatively high quota supplies, we would expect non-compliance 
to reduce the quota price, but we would expect the opposite effect at relatively 
low quota supplies. These predictions from Chapter 3 were employed in order to 
examine the impact of fringe non-compliance upon a compliant dominant firm.
Considering firstly a dominant firm with market power only in the quota market, 
in the case of an expected penalty function containing a relative violation argument 
the results depend upon the position of the residual quota supply on the fringe (in­
verse) demand curve. When the dominant firm is behaving as a monopolist in the 
quota market, for example, non-compliance in the fringe can reduce the quota price 
and increase the dominant firm’s quota demand where the equilibrium quota price
is relatively low, but have the opposite effect' where the quota price is relatively 
high, with non-compliance increasing both the quota price and the dominant firm’s 
quota demand at some intermediate point on the fringe inverse demand curve. The 
converse holds when the dominant firm is exercising monopsony power in the quota 
market. Where the residual quota supply to the fringe is relatively high and the 
dominant firm is exercising monopoly power in the quota market, we have the possi­
bility that fringe non-compliance may cause the dominant firm to hold excess quota. 
The corollary here is that increasing enforcement effort may prevent the dominant 
firm from holding excess quota. The opposite holds where the residual quota supply 
to the fringe is relatively low: now increasing enforcement in the fringe would make 
it more likely that the dominant firm withholds quota from the market.
Similar effects are predicted if the dominant firm is also non-compliant, although 
the impact of fringe non-compliance on the dominant firm’s violation rate was found
to be ambiguous.
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Finally, in the case of a compliant dominant firm with market power in both quota 
and output markets, we found that the effects of fringe non-compliance were gen­
erally ambiguous, although not substantially changing the main conclusions of the 
previous chapter.
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6. Conclusions
6.1 Summary and discussion of results
In Chapter 3 we analysed a fishing firm’s optimal choices of catch and quota when 
non-compliant, using a simple model of a firm maximising expected profits. If we 
assume, as is the case throughout the literature on pollution permits, that expected 
penalties for non-compliance depend upon level violations, then we obtain similar 
results to those previously published for pollution permit markets. For example, we 
would predict that non-compliance renders the industry inverse quota demand less 
elastic and implies lower quota prices for any given TAC or total quota supply (e.g., 
Malik, 2002). Changing the specification of the violation argument in the expected 
penalty function from the level violation size to the relative violation size, however, 
can lead to fundamentally different conclusions about the effects of non-compliance 
on quota demands in the fishery and on the equilibrium quota price. We saw that 
expected penalties as a function of relative violations of quota demands mean that
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non-compliant firms are never indifferent between cheating and buying quota, as 
they are when expected penalties are a function of level violations. This leads to the 
possibility, at relatively high quota prices, of non-compliant quota demands which 
are greater than those of compliant firms. The corollary is that, at relatively low 
TACs, we can have equilibrium quota prices which are higher than they would be 
in a compliant industry. The implications for fisheries management using ITQs are 
potentially significant. For example, if we do not observe falling quota prices, we 
cannot necessarily conclude that there is no increase in cheating in the fishery. At 
the same time, increasing quota prices (for a given TAC) do not necessarily suggest 
increasing profitability in the fishery; they may, in part at least, be attributable 
to increased cheating. As a consequence, quota prices on their own may provide 
misleading signals and caution should therefore be exercised in using them to make 
fishery management decisions.
Modelling expected penalties as dependent upon relative violations, it is argued, 
may be more realistic in fisheries and also in many other regulatory settings. In
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most environmental regulation enforcement systems, for example, the probability of 
detection of an infringement and subsequent sanction is very likely to be dependent 
upon the relative violation of an allowance or standard, rather than the level viola­
tion. The intuition for this is clear if one considers, for example, the sensitivity of
measurement and monitoring processes, or margins of tolerance in inspection and 
sanction, which are very often inherently relative concepts.
Chapter 4 then looked at the profit maximising behaviour of a dominant fishing firm 
faced by a competitive fringe, in this case assuming that all firms are quota compli­
ant. The main focus of the analysis is the case of a dominant firm with market power 
in both the quota market and the corresponding output market, an area which has 
received little attention to date. The analysis of a firm with market dominance only 
in the quota market closely mirrors the results derived by Hahn (1984) and Malik 
(2002) for a dominant firm in a pollution permit market. We saw that if the initial 
allocation of quota to the dominant firm is sufficiently large, it will demand quota 
in excess of that required for its own (unconstrained) level of output, so that quota
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is withheld from the competitive fringe in order to support the quota price. Total 
economic profit in the industry, however, is strictly decreasing in the dominant firm’s 
initial quota allocation everywhere beyond the efficient level, i.e., the level at which 
production is efficiently allocated between all firms in the industry. An objection 
that has been raised to these market power results as applied to ITQ markets is 
that, in subsequent periods, quota holdings will tend to converge towards efficient 
levels and (hence) competitive quota prices (e.g., Weninger and Just, 1997, 2002). 
However, it is commonly the case in ITQ fisheries that lease markets predominate, 
so that inefficient allocations of “permanent” quota may persevere (e.g., Armstrong 
2008). Thus, short run (static) models of quota demand may be fairly representative 
of real outcomes.
Where the dominant firm has market power in both quota and output markets, 
the choices of the firm are also sensitive to the impact upon the output price, not 
only of its own level of production, but also that of the competitive fringe, which 
is in turn determined by its own quota demand. In contrast to the conclusion of
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Anderson’s (1991) analysis, we found that we cannot rule out the possibility that 
the firm will purchase quota in order to withhold it from production, except in 
the limiting case where the firm’s initial quota endowment is zero. The conclusion 
that a dominant firm in an ITQ fishery can only influence the output market if 
it initially holds a very large quota allocation appears, therefore, to be incorrect. 
One possible policy implication, as a general “rule of thumb” for the avoidance 
of output restriction under ITQs, follows from the observation that the amount of 
excess quota demanded is always strictly less than the firm’s initial allocation. The 
effect on total industry economic profits, and hence on total welfare, of altering the 
initial allocation to the dominant firm is now ambiguous, depending inter alia upon 
the slope of the consumer demand for the industry output.
Chapter 5 introduced non-compliance into the analysis of market dominance. First, 
we examined the case of a non-compliant dominant firm faced by a compliant com­
petitive fringe, with the dominant firm having market power only in the quota 
market. Here, as Malik (2002) notes, it is possible for the dominant firm’s initial
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quota allocation to be sufficiently large that it holds excess quota and is therefore 
compliant. Otherwise, the firm will be non-compliant (see below). The comparative 
static analysis differs from Malik’s if the firm’s expected penalty is assumed to be a 
function of its relative violation, as here the firm’s violation rate is firstly decreas­
ing, and then increasing, as its initial quota allocation (and hence the equilibrium 
quota price) is increased. Total industry output also decreases and then increases as 
the initial allocation to the dominant firm is increased, so that there is some initial 
quota allocation at which total output is minimised.
If the dominant firm also has market power in the output market, then depending 
upon the structure of both quota and output markets, as well as the dominant firm’s 
own capacity in relation to total industry capacity and the TAC, the dominant 
firm may be voluntarily compliant whatever its initial quota allocation, even to the 
extent of holding excess quota, provided its initial quota endowment is non-zero. As 
a corollary, we can conclude that a dominant firm may hold excess quota whether 
it exercises monopoly or monopsony power in the quota market, or even if it does
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not enter the quota market. If the firm’s initial quota endowment is zero, on the 
other hand, the firm will, unambiguously, cheat. In this case, however, we saw from 
the analysis in the previous chapter that the firm may still have a positive quota 
demand, even in the absence of enforcement. Restricting a dominant firm’s initial 
quota allocation will reduce the extent to which it may hold quota off the market, 
but will also increase the likelihood that it will be non-compliant.
The implications of non-compliance in the fringe here differ from those derived by 
Malik (2002) if expected penalties are assumed to depend upon relative violations. 
My analysis also differs from Malik’s in that changes in fringe non-compliance are 
explicitly modelled in terms of changes in the regulator’s enforcement effort. When a 
(compliant) dominant firm is behaving as a monopolist in the quota market, for ex­
ample, fringe non-compliance can reduce the quota price and increase the dominant
firm’s quota demand where the quota price is relatively low, but have the opposite 
effect where the price is relatively high. The converse holds when the dominant 
firm is exercising monopsony power in the quota market. Where the residual quota
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supply to the fringe is relatively high and the dominant firm is exercising monopoly 
power in the quota market, there is a possibility that fringe non-compliance may in­
duce the dominant firm to hold excess quota. The corollary would be that increasing 
enforcement effort may prevent the dominant firm from holding excess quota. On 
the other hand, the opposite holds where the residual quota supply to the fringe is 
relatively low: here increasing enforcement in the fringe would make it more likely 
that the dominant firm withholds quota from the market.
Finally, in the case of a dominant firm with market power in both quota and output 
markets, the effects of fringe non-compliance were found to be ambiguous. This 
is perhaps unsurprising, since non-compliance in the fringe makes the relationship 
between the (residual) quota supply to the fringe and its aggregate output indeter­
minate. The impact upon the output price of changes in the dominant firm’s quota 
demand is then uncertain.
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6.2 Further research
One clear topic for further investigation is the impact of non-compliance on quota 
asset prices. Although the literature usually assumes that cheating tends to lower 
quota lease prices, there is a stylised fact at large that suggests that non-compliant 
fishermen are able to outbid compliant fishermen for quota. The relationship be­
tween lease and asset prices when there is non-compliance is a potentially interesting 
area for investigation.
Other areas for further research, suggested by reality in most fisheries, require exten­
sions to the basic model and, inevitably, added complexity. One is the implication 
of stochastic catch. Another is the impact of discarding fish prior to landing (for 
example, discarding of grades of fish which are not worth landing legally because 
they have an expected value less than the prevailing quota price). The literature 
on discarding under ITQs has focused on the incentives to discard, rather than the 
impact upon quota markets (e.g., Anderson, 1994, Vestergaard 1996).
The model could also be extended to the case of a multi-species fishery, so that firms 
are faced with multiple quota markets for products which are jointly produced. More 
fundamentally, the model could be adapted to take into account the share or “lay” 
system, under which many, if not most, fisheries operate, whereby the crew (i.e., 
labour) are paid a share of the value of the catch after the deduction of operating 
costs (see, for example, McConnell and Price, 2006). It would be interesting to 
examine the impact of non-compliance in this case.
Finally, there is scope for restricting the generality of the models, in particular of 
market power in quota and output markets (both with and without non-compliance) 
in order to identify cases in which unambiguous results can be shown.
In summary, the research presented in this thesis has developed a general model of 
short run firm behaviour in a single quota market, allowing for both non-compliance 
and the exercise of market power, which forms a basis for further development along 
various lines.
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